8

THE GREAT BETRAYAL

The French, Russian and English Governments Betrayed

Their Own Peoples. The World War was Precipitated.

The corruption of the French government, politicians and the press; the election of Poincaré to the French presidency, with the aid of Russian bribe money; the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife; and the secret mobilization of the Serbian army against Austria-Hungary brought the joint Russian, French and English plan dangerously close to its realization. The Russian government had decided to mobilize over one million men of the Russian army and its Baltic fleet against Austria-Hungary and Germany, before either Germany or Austria-Hungary had issued orders for the mobilization of their armies; France was urging Russia to make war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, and promised Russia full support in the event a war should break out; and the English government accorded sufficient encouragement to the Russian government to prepare for war and to precipitate a conflict, into which Austria-Hungary and Germany were intended to be forced. The field was cleared, the fuse was fixed, and the only act remaining to be done was to light the fuse and thus engulf Europe in a destructive flame of war.

It will be well to recall that prior to the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife Europe was divided into two camps: the Triple Entente, consisting of England, France and Russia; and the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Triple Alliance represented that type of the people of Europe, who were creators and builders and who, believing in the golden rule of "live and let live," were building the transcontinental railway system, known as the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, extending from Berlin, Germany, into and through Austria, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, across the Dardanelles into Turkey and terminating at Bagdad. It is universally known and acknowledged that when and if the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system is completed and successfully operated, an economic boom and an unprecedented prosperity will start in Europe and Asia Minor, the like of which has never been experienced in that part of the world. The peoples of the Triple Alliance, therefore, can be said to have stood for the economic building up of Europe and for the prosperity, happiness, contentment and peace of the people living there.

Every American knows how much the American transportation systems, our railroads, waterways, paved roads and airlines have contributed to the economic, commercial and intellectual building up of our country. The Berlin-Bagdad Railway system was calculated to perform the same service for Europe and Asia Minor, and it is predicted that when that railway system will be completed, Europe will be united into one great economic federation which will bar and eliminate any cause, reason or necessity for war.

The Triple Entente was under the control of a group of men of the type of leeches and parasites who lived on the fruit of the labor of the creating and building type of mankind. A united, prosperous, happy, contented and peaceful people of Europe would be an anathema to the leeches and parasites who were controlling the Triple Entente. And since the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system was the key to a united Europe and to European prosperity, contentment, happiness and peace, the leeches and parasites determined to prevent the completion and successful operation of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system; and, in order to accomplish their diabolical purpose, they bribed, corrupted and prostituted the French government, French politicians and the French press; employed, financed and directed the Serbian terrorists, the Serbian Black Hand society and made murderers out of the Serbian government and criminal conspirators out of the Serbian royal family; and they finally brought suffering, sorrow and misery upon mankind.

Russia was brought into the camp of the Triple Entente by promises made by France and England that she would be helped in her effort and plan to seize the Dardanelles so that she might have an outlet for her ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. France and England were never sincere and honest in making this promise to Russia, because they have never permitted in the past and, as long as they are controlled by the leeches and parasites, they will never willingly permit Russia to seize and control the Dardanelles or to have an all-year-round ice-free seaport anywhere in the world. This antagonistic attitude of France and England toward Russia regarding an ice-free seaport was fully demonstrated and proved, when the Paris Peace Conference refused to give the Dardanelles to Russia, despite the fact that Russia was drawn into the camp of the Triple Entente by the promise that the Triple Entente would help Russia to seize and control the Dardanelles.

As we have said, the German Emperor had fully recognized the need and right of Russia to an ice-free seaport; the Russian Czar had fully recognized and admitted the great need for the Berlin Bagdad Railway system and its great benefit even to Russia; and the two monarchs had settled the problem by agreeing that the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad should be completed, as planned, and Russia should have a railroad through Persia to the Persian Gulf; but the leeches and parasites frustrated this peaceful settlement and, to make certain that it would never be revived or realized, they had the Russian Czar murdered in cold blood and his family exterminated.

The people of Russia had no power to prevent the leeches and parasites from drawing them into an unnecessary and bloody war. The people of France did not want war; but they were misled and incited into the war by their politicians and press, who were bribed and corrupted with Russian money. The people and Parliament of England did not want war; but they were forced into it through misrepresentations. Neither the Russians, nor the French nor the English people would have been willing to fight in the World War if they had known the truth; and that was exactly the reason why the leeches and parasites resorted to bribery and corruption to mislead the peoples of the Triple Entente in preparation for the World War.

The people of Russia were all right; the people of France were all right; and the people of England were all right; but their political leaders betrayed them and as a result millions of them were killed and millions of them maimed, and their actions brought economic and moral bankruptcy upon mankind. The people, God's noblest creatures, had no choice in the matter:

"Theirs not to make reply,

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do or die!"

You have been shown that, after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife, the Austro-Hungarian government made a demand on Serbia to stop the agitation against Austria-Hungary and to punish the murderers of the Archduke and his wife. Egged on by the French and Russian governments and encouraged by the government of England, instead of complying with the proper and rightful demands of Austria-Hungary, the Serbian government secretly ordered the mobilization of the entire Serbian army and then sent an evasive reply to Austria-Hungary which said that if Austria-Hungary did not like their attitude, they could go to The Hague. Austria-Hungary could have but one answer and that was the mobilization of a part of the Austrian army, which was done six hours after the mobilization of the Serbian army was ordered by the Serbian government.

Under the circumstances, and under the self-defense and self-preservation clauses of international law, it was the unquestionable right and duty of the Austro-Hungarian government to mobilize a part of the Austrian army exactly as was done. A country does not have to wait with its mobilization until the enemy invades its territory; and it would have been unpardonable negligence on the part of the Austro-Hungarian government to delay mobilization or to risk a sudden invasion of their territory by the Serbian or Russian armies.

In order to understand better what happened after the mobilization of the Serbian army, it should be pointed out here that Austria-Hungary and Germany, both for reasons of self-defense and self-preservation and because of their common interest in the completion and successful operation of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system, were bound, by a mutual agreement, to come to each other's help in case of an attack upon either or both of them by a foreign power; and Italy was their ally. It was, therefore, the contractual duty of Germany to come to the aid of Austria-Hungary in the event of a foreign attack upon them; it was the same duty of Austria-Hungary to come to the assistance of Germany in the event she was attacked by a foreign power; and the same agreement had been made with Italy.

England, France and Russia had a like agreement among themselves, so that in the event of an attack by a foreign power on either or all of them, it was the duty of each of these allied powers to come to each other's assistance. There was, however, no treaty or contractual obligation on the part of either England, France or Russia to come to the defense of Serbia and help her to become and indefinitely remain the nest of terrorism and the powder keg of Europe. Nor were England and France obligated by treaty to come to the assistance of Russia in the event she was the aggressor in a war.

The question, therefore, now presents itself: Who was or who were the aggressors in the World War? International law, as you will recall, defines the aggressor as follows:

1. "The real aggressor is not he who first employs force, but he who renders the employment of force necessary.

2. "The government which, without a just cause or provocation, mobilizes its military forces against another country first is the real aggressor.

3. "The mobilization of the military forces of one country against another country is equivalent to a declaration of war on the country against which the mobilization is directed."

Commonly said, the real aggressor is he who "asks for it." This is true in civil life. If your adversary draws a gun and you have good reason to believe that your life is in danger, it is your legal right, as a matter of self-defense and self-preservation, to down your adversary and to kill him, if necessary. He, who puts you in fear of your life, is the aggressor.

Thus far is developed the following picture: England, France and Russia were determined to involve Germany in a war, to defeat her and destroy the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system. The only way to involve Germany was to force Austria-Hungary into a war with Serbia and to this end the Archduke of Austria was assassinated. Austria-Hungary sent an ultimatum to Serbia, demanding that agitation against Austria-Hungary be stopped and the persons who assassinated the Archduke be apprehended, tried and punished. At 3 P.M. on July 25, 1914, Serbia ordered the mobilization of her army against Austria-Hungary and then sent an answer to Austria-Hungary, saying that if Austria-Hungary did not like their attitude in the matter, they could go to The Hague. The French government favored war and promised military aid to Russia; and the English government strongly indicated that she would go to the aid of Russia in event of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

To be explicit and chronological:

June 28, 1914. The Archduke of Austria and his wife were assassinated.

July 20, 1914. Poincaré, the President of France, assured the Czar of Russia that France would aid Russia.{1}

July 22, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian government sent an ultimatum to Serbia.

July 24, 1914. The French Foreign Office was ordered to prepare for war.{2}

July 24, 1914. Secret military plans between France and Russia were arranged.{3}

July 24, 1914. The English government promised aid to France and Russia.{4}

July 24, 1914. At 3 P.M. the Russian government decided to mobilize part of the Russian army and navy against Austria-Hungary and Germany.{5}

July 25, 1914. The French government promised military aid to Russia in event of a war against Austria-Hungary and Germany.{6}

July 25, 1914. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the Serbian Government ordered the mobilization of the entire Serbian army against Austria-Hungary.{7}

July 25, 1914. At 6 o'clock in the evening the Serbian government dispatched its reply to Austria-Hungary.{8}

July 25, 1914. At 9 o'clock in the evening Austria ordered the mobilization of a part of her army.{9}

There is ample evidence, as Professor Barnes states, that:{10}

"Serbia was determined to resist Austria and enter the local war which she hoped would bring Russia to her rescue and set off the European conflagration that would at its close bring into being Greater Serbia. She had been preparing for the conflict actively for more than a year, and for several months had been receiving shipments of arms from Russia in anticipation of the ultimate struggle with Austria."

Neither the people nor the Parliaments of France and Russia encouraged the warlike preparations of their respective governments.{11} The only acts the people of either of these countries did was to shout for war after they had been deceived and misled by politicians and newspapers that had been bribed and corrupted; therefore, when in speaking of France and Russia, always have in mind their political leaders and newspapers and not the people themselves.

Russia began the secret mobilization of her army on July 26, 1914, against Germany, when the two Russian military chiefs, Sukhomlinov and Janushkevich, called out the reservists and the militia for service in the frontier districts near Germany. As Professor Fay states:{12}

"Sukhomlinov and Janushkevich (Russian military leaders) really began secret mobilization measures against Germany on July 26th and when war actually came surprised Germany and the world by the rapidity with which the Russian troops poured into East Prussia."

Three days later, on July 29, 1914, the Russian government issued an order for general mobilization of the Russian army against Germany and Austria-Hungary. "Telegrams were at once sent to London and Paris informing the Russian Ambassadors of the ominous decision which had been made. The French government was to be thanked for its promise of support, and it was ordered that a telegram should be sent to the British government requesting it 'to range itself alongside of Russia and France without delay in order to prevent the European balance being destroyed.'{13} Dobroroloski, as chief of the mobilization division of the Russian General Staff, was instructed to telegraph the general mobilization order throughout Russia." Sazonov (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia) had dispatched a telegram to the French government asking for final and explicit approval of the decisive Russian military measures."{14}

The French government was very obliging. Poincaré, the President of France, who was elected to the presidency with the aid of Russian bribe money, promptly, in the night, called to his official residence two trusted members of the French government, namely Viviani and Messimy, and these three men, in that night conference, decided to give the answer of the French government. Viviani then sent a telegram to Paleologue, the French Ambassador to Russia, stating that

France was fully resolved to fulfill all the obligations of the alliance and advising him to tell the Russians to proceed with mobilization as secretly as possible, so as not to afford the Germans any excuse for mobilization.{15}

Public opinion in England was unfavorable for the contemplated war and Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of England, was reluctant and afraid to give his blessings so brazenly to the Russian mobilization. The English government was already committed to France and Russia; but still it was necessary to find some pretext which would justify the warlike attitude of the English government in the eyes of the English people. Later on, Sir Grey was forced to plan and prepare necessary propaganda to influence English public opinion to favor war in which Russia would be their ally and in which the unspeakable crimes of Serbia would have to be defended.

"John Bull," an English journal, published a leading article under the heading "To Hell with Serbia . . . once more, to Hell with Serbia!"{16} and then vigorously objected to any war, the purpose of which would be to defend the Serbian terrorists, gangsters and murderers.

The "Manchester Guardian," an influential English journal, bitterly exclaimed:{17}

"Of all the small powers in Europe, Serbia is, quite decidedly, the one whose name is most foully daubed with dishonor. The record of her rulers and her policy in recent years is an unmatched tissue of cruelty, greed, hypocrisy and ill-faith . . . If one could tow Serbia to the edge of the ocean and sink it, the atmosphere of Europe would be cleared."

The nocturnal secret meeting of Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy, President and members of the French government, really sealed the fate of Europe and their telegram urging the Russian government to proceed with the mobilization secretly, so that Germany might not find out, actually unleashed the dogs of war. Morhardt, an eminent French writer, in the words of Professor Barnes, quite correctly states that:{18}

"The secret conference of Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy, in consultation with Izvolski (the Russian Ambassador), on the night of the 29th of July (1914) marks the moment when the horrors of war were specifically unchained upon Europe. After that there was no chance whatever of preserving peace, and the French President and ministers knew this as well as did Izvolski (the Russian Ambassador to France) and Sazonov (the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs)."

This is significant to note, because the world now seeks to determine who the aggressors were in the World War.

That the general mobilization of the Russian army was intended to be a preparation for war against Germany and Austria-Hungary is clearly indicated by the frank admission of General Dobrorolski, chief of the mobilization division of the Russian General Staff, who knew the purpose of the mobilization. He knew that the general mobilization was an irrevocable step toward war and did not hesitate to say it in the following words:{19}

"This (the general mobilization) once fixed, there is no way backwards. This step settles automatically the beginning of war."

General Dobrorolski has further admitted that:{20}

"By July 25, 1914, war was already decided upon and the whole flood of telegrams between the Governments of Russia and Germany represented merely the mise en scéne of an historical drama."

And Pashitch, the Prime Minister of Serbia, admits that the Serbian Minister to Russia had reported to the Serbian government that:{21}

"When her (Russia's) mobilization is finished, she will declare war on Austria."

Viviani, one of the members of the French Cabinet, openly declared that:{22}

"He who mobilizes first is the aggressor."

And General Gurko, the Russian military expert, frankly confirmed in 1919 that:{23}

"Looked at from the German standpoint, the beginning of the Russian mobilization was for Germany synonymous with the necessity to begin military preparations immediately . . . The Russian mobilization meant for Germany the necessity of declaring war without wasting a single day."

The confirmation of General Gurko is fully supported by the definition of an aggressor set forth in the 1893 Franco-Russian military agreement, in which it was specifically declared that:{24}

"The first to mobilize must be held the aggressor and general mobilization is war."

From the evidence presented, it must be concluded that Russia was the first to mobilize.

What was happening in France while Russia was mobilizing?

Poincaré arrived from Russia on July 29, 1914. When he landed at Dunkirk, he was asked by Senator Trystram: "Do you believe, Mr. President, that the war can be averted?" And Poincaré replied: "To do so would be a great pity, for we shall never witness more favorable circumstances."{25}

Upon his return to Paris, Poincaré was greeted with great patriotic demonstrations and cries of "On to Berlin!" And in this connection it is well to remember that the password in Russia was: "The road to Constantinople (the Dardanelles) is through Berlin."{26} It should be further recalled that, while Poincaré was absent (in Russia), Bienvenu-Martin, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador to Paris, were discussing the Serbian-Austro-Hungarian crisis in a friendly manner, and Poincaré was greatly disturbed by it. He wanted war and he did not relish the possibility that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs might frustrate it by being too friendly with the German Ambassador.

Poincaré got busy to undo the friendly feeling that might have been created by Bienvenu-Martin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador. At his gesture the already bribed and corrupted French press began to unload and hurl invectives at Germany and Austria-Hungary. Berthelot, Poincaré's henchman, went so far as to publish in the "Echo de Paris" a grave distortion of the conversation between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador, thus inflaming French public opinion against Germany.{27} The result was that on July 30, 1914, a day later, Poincaré was able to assure the Spanish Ambassador that "he regarded European war as inevitable."{28}

On July 30, 1914, public opinion was favorable for war in France. Viviani, Poincaré's man, sent a telegram to the French Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburg (Russia), notifying them that France was ready and determined to stand by Russia and that the Russian government should be urged to continue mobilization but do it as secretly as possible, so that Germany would not hear of it. The French Ambassador in London was requested to assure the German Ambassador that the French government had not taken warlike steps but that it was doing everything to preserve peace by diplomatic means. Cambon, the French Ambassador at London, was requested to get after Sir Grey, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, and try to swing him on the Franco-Russian side, to which Mr. Grey was already aligned! Izvolski also sent a telegram to the Russian government advising it that France was on Russia's side; but for goodness' sake to speed up the mobilization; be secret about it; and tell the world that Russia was working very hard for peace.{29}

Poincaré and his fellow politicians had certainly returned the favor for the Russian bribe money they had received; and, like Judas of old, they betrayed their own people and burned the truth upon the arms of Moloch. The memory of these men will be cursed by suffering mankind for generations to come. It is unfortunate that these men should have lived and possessed power at this time to demonstrate their gorilla-like tendencies which resulted in so much woe to so many people who did not deserve to suffer the horrors of war.

The planned propagandic activities of Sir Grey, the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had added much to the betrayal of the French people by Poincaré and his cohorts, by telling the German Ambassador in one breath that "with reference to the Austrian note he recognized the good right of Austria to obtain satisfaction, as well as the legitimacy of the demand of punishment of the accomplices in the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife," and in the next breath implying to the Russian government that the English fleet had already been concentrated for the purpose of helping Russia in her contemplated war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.{30; sic, not noted} There is no question but that the war preparing propaganda of Sir Grey "had an enormous influence in the encouraging of Russian mobilization."{31} Nor is there any question that the English government was equally guilty with the French government in encouraging the Russian government secretly to mobilize the Russian army and at the same time attempting to mislead Germany. One can easily understand and appreciate the feelings of Lord Welby, formerly the head of the British Treasury Department, when he exclaimed:{32}

"We are in the hands of an organization of crooks. These are politicians, generals, manufacturers of armaments, and journalists!"

Now what was happening in Austria-Hungary while France and England were encouraging Russia to mobilize and while Russia was mobilizing? Several plans were proposed from Germany and England to avert the outbreak of hostilities by diplomatic means; but none of these plans was accepted as useful and workable, because the Serbian army of 400,000 men was waiting to advance on Austria-Hungary from the South and the Russian army of over one million men was moving on toward Austria-Hungary and Germany from the North. There was really nothing that Austria-Hungary could do to avert the impending conflict. The war was decided upon by Russia, France and England and only a divine interference could have averted it; but divine interference did not come. Yet Austria-Hungary was waiting hopefully that in someway the impending calamity might be avoided.

In Germany there was much activity on the part of the government to try to prevent hostilities. The German government did not want war, nor did the German people want war. Germany's interest was peace and prosperity of her own people and that of the people of Europe. The Serbian government wanted a Greater Serbia; the French government wanted Alsace-Lorraine from Germany; the English government wanted to defeat and destroy Germany and the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system; Russia wanted the Dardanelles from Turkey and believed that the road to the Dardanelles was through Berlin; the Austro-Hungarian government wanted peace and quiet and no disturbance from Serbia; and the German government coveted nothing, wanted nothing and only desired to be left alone to work out her own destinies and to complete the Berlin-Bagdad Railway system which would have benefited all of Europe and Asia Minor, as well as Russia, France and England. Professor Barnes said:{33}

"Everything was going smoothly in Germany. She was capturing yearly an ever greater percentage of the world's trade, her phenomenal industrial development was proceeding apace, and her chief area of imperialistic expansion was coming under her control with the general success of the Berlin-Bagdad railway system and her triumph at Constantinople . . . The responsible members of the German civil government, from the Kaiser down, were thoroughly opposed to war in the spring of 1914."

This clearly shows that the German Emperor was unalterably against permitting the Serbian-Austrian crisis to develop into a general European war; and, to demonstrate to the world that he was sincere in his effort for peace, on July 5, 1914, he went on an extended cruise, fishing, as it is said in this country. That he was deeply shocked and disappointed when he learned that the Russian Czar was interested in protecting Serbia against any punishment by Austria can be easily understood from the words in which he exclaimed:{34}

"I could not assume that the Czar would place himself on the side of bandits and regicides, even at the peril of unchaining a European war. Germans are incapable of such a conception. It is Slavic or Latin!"

The German Emperor proposed several diplomatic methods of settling the dispute between Austria and Serbia. Italy cooperated to help the realization of these plans. Even Sir Grey of England feigned interest; but nothing came of these plans, because France and Russia were bent upon precipitating a war.

This, however, did not discourage the German Kaiser. He made a direct appeal to the Russian Czar by sending him telegram after telegram, begging and pleading with him to stop the mobilization of the Russian army and try to avert the outbreak of the impending war. The Russian Czar replied to the telegrams and begged the German Kaiser to do all he could to prevent the outbreak of the threatening conflict. The sincere desire of these two monarchs to avert the outbreak of the World War is unquestionable. If it had depended upon these two monarchs, the problems of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway and the Russian ice-free port would have been solved without any bloodshed satisfactorily to the mutual benefit of Europe and Russia.

The Russian Czar ordered his aide, General Tatistchev, to go to Berlin and confer with the German Emperor on the question as to what the two monarchs could do to avert the impending catastrophe; but the General was arrested by Sazonov, the minister of foreign affairs of Russia, and was detained just as he was about to enter his compartment on the Berlin train.{35}

At 7 P.M. of July 30th (1914) the mobilization of the Russian army was in full swing. On the next day, July 31st (1914) the German government, at 1 P.M. proclaimed "the state of imminent danger of war"{36}; at 2 P.M. the German Emperor sent his last desperate appeal to the Russian Czar in a telegram saying: "The peace of Europe may still be maintained by you, if Russia will agree to stop the military measures which must threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary"{37}; at 3:30 P.M. of the same day the German government warned Russia that she would mobilize unless Russia suspended mobilization within twelve hours{38}; and then waited for a reply.

No answer was received from Russia. After waiting more than twenty-four hours, on August 1st (1914), at 5 P.M. the German government ordered the mobilization of the German army and navy.

That the German government was really patient during the hectic days, when Russia proceeded to mobilize her army which was moving toward the German border, is testified to by Judge Bausman, an American writer, who says:{39}

"To me the patience of the Kaiser is incredible . . . The fact is that if we look at this thing purely from the standpoint of German safety, the Kaiser should have ordered general mobilization a week sooner than he did, or at least have served upon Russia his ultimatum that her military preparations cease."

As we have seen, General Gurko, the Russian military expert, agrees with Judge Bausman and says:{40}

"Looked at from the German standpoint, the beginning of the Russian mobilization was for Germany synonymous with the necessity to begin military operations immediately . . . The Russian mobilization meant for Germany the necessity of declaring war without wasting a single day."

It must be concluded that both as a matter of fact and law the mobilization of the German army was fully justified. One can imagine what the United States government would do, if a Mexican army of a million men and a Canadian army of a like number of men would be moving toward the United States, intent to crush the country and annihilate its people. It would sound the alarm and every able-bodied American would shoulder a gun and hasten to recruit to repel the invaders. A government and people who would sit idle and wait until foreign armies invade the country and kill its people would not be worthy. If anybody would like to test the American people on this point, let him start mobilization and see what will happen!

Following is the picture:

July 26, 1914. Russia decided to mobilize a part of her army and navy against Austria-Hungary and Germany.{41}

July 29, 1914. Russia ordered the general mobilization of her army and navy against Germany and Austria-Hungary.{42}

July 29, 1914. The French government urged the Russian government to hasten its mobilization but to do it secretly.{43}

August 1, 1914. At 5 P.M. Germany ordered the mobilization of her army and navy.{44}

And, as we have seen, the law is that:

"He who mobilizes first is the aggressor."

There can be no question but that Russia mobilized first, without just cause, against Germany and Austria-Hungary and that, therefore, Russia must be declared to have been the aggressor.

It was apparent that war was inevitable. The Austro-Hungarian ministerial council met again to discuss the situation. Serbia was mobilizing and Russia was mobilizing; and the French government was openly offending Austria-Hungary and the French press was berating Germany and Austria-Hungary. Something had to be done, in order to prevent the Serbian and Russian armies from invading the territory of Austria-Hungary. At the present time, as a result of the demoralizing effect the Versailles treaties are having upon international behavior, it is considered proper for a country to send its armed forces into another country, shoot its people and conquer them, without giving reason or declaring war and such a move may be called a military expedition or a friendly visit or a tour of good-will. But in 1914 it was the rule that a respectable country should notify the other country in advance of a military move directed against it. Such notification was known as a declaration of war.

The Austro-Hungarian ministerial council discussed the possibility of a declaration of war against Serbia, whose army was fully mobilized; then to occupy Belgrade, the Capital of Serbia, which was just across the Danube River from Hungary, and to go and stay there until the Serbian criminals, black hands, terrorists and assassins were apprehended, tried and punished. This step would have been in accordance with the precedents established by the United States of America when we went to Cuba, when our marines occupied Vera Cruz, and our army entered Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa and his bandits. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, however, insisted that, in the event of such a move, the Austro-Hungarian government must declare to the world that the occupation of Belgrade would be only a punitive expedition and that, in the event of war, the integrity of Serbia would be respected. Accordingly the following resolution was adopted:{45}

"The Common Council of Ministers at the proposition of the Royal Hungarian Premier votes that as soon as war begins, the monarchy declares to the foreign powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom (of Serbia) contemplated."

This proves beyond any doubt that the Hungarian government did all it possibly could do to avert or, if unsuccessful, at least to minimize the danger of the outbreak of a general European war. This should be remembered especially, because the Treaty of Trianon says that Hungary was the "aggressor" and had "imposed" the World War upon Russia, France and England!

The time for temporizing had passed. Berchtold, the Common Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, on July 28, 1914, declared war on Serbia, and at the same time notified Russia and the world that Austria-Hungary's intention was to punish the Serbian gangsters and terrorists and that, in the event of war, the integrity of Serbia would be respected, or in other words, no annexation of Serbia was contemplated. Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, has since admitted that the Russian government fully believed that Austria-Hungary would not violate its promise.{46}

It will be recalled that the German Emperor frantically tried to localize the crisis between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. In addition to the plans, he suggested peace to the Russian Czar, and published an article in the "London Morning Post" on "Efforts Toward Peace"{47} and, among other things, he said:

"Berlin had tried to mediate between Petersburg and Vienna on the appeal of the Czar. But His Majesty (The Russian Czar) silently had already mobilized before the appeal; so that the mediator -- Germany -- is placed 'en demeure' and his work becomes illusory. Now only England alone can stop the catastrophe by restraining its Allies, by clearly intimating that -- as Sir E. Grey declared -- it had nothing to do with the Austro-Serbian conflict, and that if one of its Allies took an active part in the strife it could not reckon on the help of England. That would put a stop to all war."

He closed his article in the following words:

"The whole war is plainly arranged between England, France and Russia for the annihilation of Germany, lastly through the conversation with Poincaré in Paris and Petersburg, and the Austro-Serbian strife is only an excuse to fall upon us! God help us in this fight for our existence, brought about by falseness, lies and poisonous envy!"

History has abundantly proved the accuracy of the Kaiser's statement.

In his telegram to the Russian Czar, dated July 29, 1914, the German Emperor pleaded with the Czar to induce the Russian government to remain neutral in the Austro-Serbian controversy. Russia had no treaty obligation to defend the Serbian terrorists, gangsters and assassins; and it was just as improper for Russia to interfere in Austria's desire to create order near her boundary line as it would have been to interfere in the determination of the United States government to have an American expeditionary force to pursue the Mexican bandit, Villa, and his followers and to apprehend and punish them. What was right on the part of the United States of America certainly should have been right on the part of Austria-Hungary. After all, self-defense and self-preservation of a nation is the highest and indisputable right and is inherent in man. The telegram of the German Emperor to the Czar of Russia was as follows:{48}

"I received your telegram and share with your wish that peace should be maintained. But as I told you in my first telegram, I cannot consider Austria's action against Serbia an 'ignoble' war. Austria, knows by experience that Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable. I understand its action must be judged as tending to get full guarantee that Serbian promises shall become real facts. Thus my reasoning is borne out by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria does not want to make any territorial conquests at the expense of Serbia. I therefore suggest that it would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Hungarian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she has ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable and as I telegraphed to you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked on by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help."

The Russian Czar, as an individual, was willing to cooperate with the German Emperor to avoid war and, as we have seen, he tried to send his aide to Berlin, but, before his aide boarded his train, he was arrested by the Russian government and detained, so he never reached Berlin. There is no question but that the Russian Czar was prevented by his own government to do anything that might have saved the world from the subsequent catastrophe. As a matter of fairness to the later assassinated Russian Czar and to the German Emperor we must conclude that these two monarchs were sincerely trying to avoid the outbreak of the World War.

Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, because Serbia and Russia had previously mobilized against both Austria-Hungary and Germany, and there was grave danger that Austria-Hungary would be invaded by the Serbians on the South and by the Russians on the North. Mobilization is an act of war and the same is equivalent to a declaration of war. By her treaty obligations Germany was bound to come to the aid of Austria-Hungary; and in addition the Russian army and navy were being mobilized against Germany also. An ultimatum was sent by Germany to Russia, demanding that the mobilization of the Russian army cease. Russia ignored the ultimatum. Germany waited twenty-four hours for the answer. The answer was mobilization of the Russian army. There was no escape for Germany. The time to act had arrived.

At 2 o'clock P.M. of August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia.

Izvolski, the Russian Ambassador to Paris, and co-conspirator of Poincaré, rubbed his hands and joyfully exclaimed: "This is my war!" There was rejoicing in Paris and London; but in Berlin the Emperor of Germany was greatly distressed; Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, was near a collapse; and "the German Ambassador to Russia broke down and wept when he handed the declaration of war to Sazanov," the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia.{49}

There are times when men, creators and builders, weep, while the leeches and parasites laugh and rejoice. When He saw that the work of his lifetime was collapsing, even the Son of Man wept.{50}

The next move was now up to the French and English governments. Public opinion in France had been whipped up by the bribed and corrupted newspapers and politicians, and the French government would have experienced no serious opposition from the French people even if it had immediately jumped into the affray; but public opinion in England and even in the United States of America had to be satisfied as to the justification of France to enter the war. France had no treaty obligation to support Russia if and when she was the aggressor; nor had England any treaty obligation to support either France or Russia in the situation that had just been created in which they were the aggressors. Both the French and English governments, however, were so committed to each other and to Russia, that a pretext had to be found, which might justify these governments in the eyes of the world for joining Russia in her unjustified war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Professor Barnes says:{51}

"We know now that late in the evening of July 31st (1914) the French government had firmly and irrevocably decided upon war, and that at 1 A.M. on the morning of August 1st (1914), Izvolski telegraphed this information to Sazanov. Hence, France had decided upon war at least sixteen hours before Germany declared war on Russia. Technically France was not bound by the terms of the alliance with Russia to come to her aid in 1914, in the light of the priority of the Russian mobilization to that of the German."

It should not be supposed, however, that everybody in France was clamoring for war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. There were men and women in France who were not influenced by the bribed and corrupted newspapers and bad politicians. Peace meetings were held in Paris and elsewhere in France and vigorous objections to war were voiced; but the French government broke up the peace meetings; and finally the French peace leader, Jean Juares{51-a} was assassinated in cold blood by Russian secret service men at the instigation of Izvolski. The bribed and corrupted newspapers were berating Germany and Austria-Hungary; they distorted the facts, the truth and the news of the day; and the French government enforced a most rigid censorship on the unbribed and uncorrupted newspapers. There is a good deal of truth in the statement of the French writer, Georges Demartial, in which he said:{52} "The French people were thrown into the war as helpless as a bound chicken destined for the spit." It is a matter of historical fact that the French government refused to submit to the French Parliament the question whether France should enter the war or not.{53}

In England there was considerable opposition to war. "The Manchester Guardian" stated in its editorials of July 28 and July 30, 1914:

"Not only are we neutral now, but we could and ought to remain neutral throughout the whole course of the war. We have not a shred of reason for thinking that the triumph of Germany in a European war in which we had been neutral would injure a single British interest, however small, whereas the triumph of Russia would create a situation for us really formidable. If Russia makes a general war out of a local war it will be a crime against Europe. If we, who might remain neutral, rush into the war or let our attitude remain doubtful, it will be both a crime and an act of supreme and gratuitous folly."{54}

To quiet public opinion in England a diplomatic ruse was worked out and put into operation. Upon the suggestion of the English government, the French government issued an order publicly to withdraw French soldiers from near the German borders. To show the world that the order was carried out, a few soldiers here and there were moved from one station to another; but the main French force remained where it was before. As Viviani and Messimy frankly admitted before the Chamber of Deputies on January 31, 1919:

"It was purely and simply a diplomatic ruse to impress the peoples of England, France and Italy with the apparent fact that France was doing everything in her power to avert even the appearance of wishing war. In this manner Poincaré and Viviani hoped to rally the French people to the support of their government, to put British public opinion behind Sir Edward Grey in coming to the assistance of France, and to help to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance."{55}

It is now known that the French withdrawal order was given at the instigation of the English government and it was so revealed by Gerald Campbell of the "London Times."{56} The English government was not a bit on a higher plane than the French and Russian governments were; it had no compunction whatsoever against deceiving, misleading and carrying its own people into a war of carnage. And

"The bluff worked perfectly, not only in the case of England, but also with respect to France and Italy."{57}

It is pitiful to relate that:{58}

"Grey (the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs) fully realized that the French withdrawal order was absolutely a diplomatic subterfuge and, yet, he cooperated fully with Cambon and Viviani (both French) in using this ruse to deceive his own countrymen as to the acts and policies of Russia and France."

While the French and British governments were enacting the diplomatic horse-play and going through their pantomimic performances of diplomatic subterfuge and trickery, France was quietly mobilizing her army against Germany and Austria-Hungary. We have seen that on July 31st (1914) Poincaré, the President of France, held a night conference with Viviani and Messimy in the official residence of Poincaré; that then and there it was decided that France would go to war; and Izvolski, the Russian Ambassador, was instructed so to notify the Russian government. Izvolski then sent the following telegram to the Russian government:{59}

"The French Minister of War disclosed to me with high spirits that the French Government have firmly decided upon war, and begged me to confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany and that Austria will be treated as a quantité négligeable (negligible quantity)."

The decision of the French government, therefore, on the night of July 31, 1914, was equivalent to a declaration of war on Germany, if not also on Austria-Hungary. On August 1st, at 3:30 P.M., the French government announced that it had formally ordered the mobilization of the French army and that five French corps on the German frontier were ready for war.{60}

A part of the French army was dangerously near the Alsace frontier, while another part, together with an English army, was ready to invade and attack Germany through Belgium. Surrounded by the mobilized military forces of Russia and France, on August 4, 1914, Germany declared war on France.

England was still out of war, so far as public announcement of it was concerned; secretly, however, she was in it. The English government was still waiting to play its trump card that was hidden in its sleeves. That trump card was the neutrality of Belgium. If Germany could somehow be induced to enter Belgium, the English government would immediately declare that the English people must go to help save the neutrality of Belgium.

The neutrality of Belgium was this: In 1839 England, France, Austria, Prussia and Holland signed an agreement to the effect that Belgium shall be perpetually neutral and no foreign government may annex it. This treaty, however, did not bind the signatories to go to the defense of Belgium, in the event any other foreign power would violate her neutrality by passing through her territory. As Professor Barnes states:{61}

"Not only international lawyers and historians, but every English statesman who faced the Belgian issue -- Palmertson, Lord Derby, Gladstone and Salisbury -- all agreed that the treaty of 1839 did not bind England to defend the Belgian neutrality."

In fact, as Dr. Ewart states:{62}

"British opinion in 1887 repudiated liability to withstand the passage of German armies through Belgium . . . The United Kingdom was under no treaty obligation to intervene in the war."

The opinion of international lawyers, historians and English statesmen to the effect that the neutrality of Belgium was no cause for England to enter the war had considerably upset Sir Grey's plan to drag England into the war. Grey admits in his biography that he would have tried to involve England in the war irrespective of Belgium, and that, if he had failed in that, he would have resigned.{63} As a matter of fact Grey was prepared to enter the war, even if he had to violate the Belgian neutrality; and as we shall see French and British military plans were already drawn up for the invasion of Belgium and even plans for the exchange of currency were drawn up for the eventuality. But Sir Grey did not want the British public to know that. And on July 31, 1914, he was not exactly certain just how Belgium would receive the solicitude of the British government for her neutrality, so he decided to ask the Belgian government as to how it felt about the matter. In a telegram dated July 31, 1914, he instructed the British Minister in Brussels, Belgium as follows:{64}

"You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired."

The Belgian government replied as follows:{65}

"Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power."

It will be observed that Belgium did not ask England to help her by armed forces to preserve her neutrality. The answer of Belgium might easily be interpreted to mean: Mind your own business; I shall take care of mine. And probably Grey accepted it to mean about as much; but his face must have been red, when later he learned that Belgium was talking of diplomatic help and not armed forces.

Grey must have been distressed on August 1, 1914, when the German Ambassador proposed to him that Germany will respect the neutrality of Belgium and will not cross her territory, if England will remain neutral. On the same day Grey sent the following telegram to the British Ambassador in Berlin:{66}

"The German Ambassador asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

Here was an opportunity for Grey to demonstrate that he was sincere, when he advocated the sanctity of the Belgian neutrality. By keeping England out of the war, he could insure the neutrality of Belgium, without the shedding of a single drop of English blood; but the neutrality of Belgium was of no real importance to Grey, because he wanted to fight Germany at any cost and under any condition.

The plan to use Belgian neutrality as a hoax was not working out very satisfactorily; but there was a "war gang" in England, composed of Bonar Law and an "Englishman" by the name of Leo J. Maxse, the editor of the "National Review." Professor Barnes says of Maxse that he was "the most vocal and detestable of British chauvinists."{67} On August 2, 1914, these two men and others of the "war hawks" formulated and handed to Grey the following letter:{68}

"Lord Lansdow and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture and we offer our unhesitating support to the government in any measure they may consider necessary for that object.

Very truly yours,

A. Bonar Law."

It will be observed that the "war hawks," including the delectable Mr. Maxse, did not mention Belgian neutrality; they wanted war on Germany, without any string tied to it.

Grey then handed the following note to the French Ambassador:{69}

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

To the British Ambassador in Paris Grey stated that:{70}

"This did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated."

The bottom of this proposition was knocked out on the next day, when the German Ambassador notified Grey, that Germany would refrain from attacking the French coasts or French shipping, if England would remain neutral.

It was certain that England would not remain neutral, regardless of what Germany would do or would not do. It was also known that France and England planned to invade Germany through Belgium. To ward off a sudden attack by France and England through Belgium, Germany requested the Belgian government to permit German troops to pass through Belgian territory to prevent the invasion of Germany. This request was refused by the Belgian government, probably because the English government put pressure on Belgium. On August 3, 1914, Grey sent the following telegram to the British Ambassador at Brussels (Belgium) and, virtually shaking his fists at Belgium, saying:{71}

"You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government EXPECT that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years."

This was really an ultimatum to Belgium to reject any German proposal and to come into the war on the side of England, France and Russia. The Belgian government fully understood the British ultimatum and sent the following reply:{72}

"The Belgian Government is firmly determined to resist by all means in its power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the defense of her territory. There should be concerted and joint action to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium."

At last Grey and his henchmen had something of value in their hands. The next morning, after the receipt of the note, Prime Minister Asquith told the British House of Commons that lo, behold, there was "the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium."

On August 4, 1914, the British government sent an ultimatum to Germany and said:

"His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

Events were moving rapidly. On August 3, 1914, Germany declared war on France. On August 4, 1914, England declared war on Germany; and on the same day Germany declared war on Belgium. The World War was on.

This is the full picture of the important moves made by the various governments toward war.

July 26, 1914. Russia decided to mobilize a part of her army and navy.

July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. July 29, 1914. Russia ordered a general mobilization of her army and navy against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

July 29, 1914. The French government decided upon war and notified the Russian government to proceed with the mobilization of her army secretly.

July 30, 1914. The French government definitely decided on war.

August 1, 1914. At 3 P.M. France officially mobilized the French army and navy against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

August 1, 1914. At 5 P.M. Germany ordered the mobilization of the German army and navy.

August 1, 1914. Germany declared war on Russia.

August 4, 1914. Germany declared war on France.

August 4, 1914. England declared war on Germany.

August 4, 1914. Germany declared war on Belgium.

Under the rule of international law, "he who mobilizes first is the aggressor." The government that first ordered mobilization and the government that first announced that it was through with diplomacy and was determined to go to war was the aggressor. It is true that Russia took the first step in mobilization two days before a part of the Austrian army was mobilized and five days before Germany mobilized. It is also true that the French government had definitely decided upon war on Germany and Austria-Hungary sixteen hours before Germany declared war on Russia and two and a half days before Germany declared war on France. In the words of Professor Barnes:{73; sic, not noted}

"The Russians were the first to take steps which they knew must lead to war."

But:

"France was the first country in the European crisis officially to announce her determination upon war." In other words, "The French were the first to declare themselves through with diplomacy and determined upon war."

"The only direct and immediate responsibility for the general European war falls upon Russia and France."

As to the guilt of England we have seen enough evidence to conclude that she was equally guilty with France and Russia. She had been preparing for the World War for years, as proved by none other than the English Statesman, Lord Haldane, whose statements have been reproduced by Morel in his book "Before the War," partly as follows:{74}

"Within five years, by the end of 1910, the detailed plans, the existence of which Lord Grey was so anxious to conceal from the House in August, 1914, had been worked out. Lord Haldane had solved his problem of how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier, which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain, a force of 160,000 men to operate with the French armies, with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East . . . British and French staff officers had thoroughly reconnoitered the ground upon which the allied armies were to fight in Belgium and in France; Sir Henry Wilson had been all over it on his bicycle . . . The French army would take the offensive against Germany, with the help of the British army on its left flank, on the tenth day after mobilization."

This plan was ready in 1910 and it did not leave much neutrality to Belgium. Lord Haldane testified before a British Commission to the effect that on August 4, 1914, a few hours after the declaration of war against Germany, some of the English troops were on French soil.{75}

Major W. Cyprian Bridge, official translator of the British War Office in 1914, testified, as follows:{76}

"But what impressed me more than all was the fact that about an hour after we declared war on the fatal day of 4th of August (1914) there was taken out of its hiding place a big document marked 'very secret.' It was drawn up in French and was entrusted to me for translation. It proved to be an elaborate agreement between the British and French Governments regarding the manner in which payments on behalf of the British Expeditionary Force operating in North France were to be adjusted. It went into details, for instance as to the rate of exchange at which calculations were to be made, such as military officers of experience would know could only be useful or necessary if the plan was expected to be put into almost immediate execution. The document was dated and signed in February, I think the 4th, 1914."

Sir Grey, the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on August 3, 1914, denied on the floor of the House that there was any agreement with France that would obligate the English government to send a large English army to France and read a letter which he had written to Cambon, the French Ambassador, but he left out the part which was of importance, and which the House and the people should have heard. But, as a courageous English scholar, Fredrick Corwallis Coneybeare, wrote on August 4, 1922:{77}

"Grey was doubtless as much of a hypocrite in the week before the War as he had been eight years before that. We attacked Germany for three reasons: (1) to down her navy before it got any larger; (2) to capture her trade; (3) to take her colonies."

To complete the record, it might be added that Russia declared war on Turkey on October 30, 1915; Great Britain on Turkey on November 5, 1915; France on Turkey on November 5, 1915; Italy on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915; Roumania on Austria-Hungary and Germany on August 27, 1916; and Italy on Germany on August 27, 1916.

The problem that remained to be solved was, how to get the United States of America into the World War; and eventually that problem was solved satisfactorily so far as England, France and Russia were concerned. Great Britain went about on the high seas as if she controlled the entire world. In violation of international law regarding blockade, contraband and continuous voyage, Great Britain practically destroyed the rights of neutrals, shut off all imports into Germany and prevented neutral countries, including the United States of America, from carrying on commerce. This British lawlessness went so far as to intercept European mail destined to the United States of America, used the American flag on British ships, seized and searched American state officials below the rank of ministers while traveling to and fro from their continental posts.{77} The plan in this lawlessness of Great Britain was to starve out Germany.

In retaliation and to protect herself, as was her undoubted right under international law, Germany inaugurated a submarine warfare against Great Britain and sunk a number of ships that were proper objects of attack under the law regulating warfare. The submarine activities of the German navy eventually was used as a pretext to inveigle the United States of America into the World War.

Professor Barnes, one of the leading American historians, places blame on the United States government for the continued lawlessness of Great Britain, which forced Germany into the submarine activity. Says Professor Barnes:{78}

"If the United States had held England strictly to international law upon threat of severance of diplomatic relations or even war, as we have done in the case of Germany and as we unquestionably should have done in the case of England, the German submarine warfare would not have been necessary and probably would not have been utilized. So we may say with absolute certainty that it was the unneutrality, lack of courage, or maladroitness of the Washington authorities in regard to English violations of international law which produced the German submarine warfare that actually led us into war."

It is no secret now that:{79}

"President Wilson and Colonel House had decided that we would come into the war a year before the submarine warfare was resumed by Germany."

Although, as the "Alexander Hamilton Institute Business Conditions Weekly" has stated in its December 25, 1936 issue, "nobody of intelligence and intellectual honesty believes that America really had a common cause with any of the allies," the United States government declared war on Germany on April 8, 1917, and the American people were told that we were going to "make the world safe for democracy."

The pretext used by the United States government to enter the conflict on the side of England, France and Russia was the torpedoing and sinking by a German submarine of the passenger ship, "Lusitania" which, in violation of the laws of warfare, was loaded in New York harbor with six million pounds of ammunition and explosives, and was equipped with high power naval rifles in conformity with England's new policy of arming passenger boats. This made the "Lusitania" a war vessel that could legally be attacked by England's enemies. The German navy was acting within the boundaries of international law; nevertheless we took an exception to the rule and declared war on Germany.

The real reason why we entered the World War on England's side was that it was more profitable for certain interests than to remain neutral or even to enter the war on Germany's side. As Professor Barnes has correctly stated:{80}

"From the beginning, the international banking houses of the United States had taken a distinctly unneutral attitude, favoring investments in the bonds of the Allied countries, and discouraging or refusing investment in the paper of the Central Powers. This immediately gave us a strong financial stake in the cause of the Entente, and this stake grew larger with each year of the war. Likewise, American industry inevitably became violently pro-Ally. This was due to the fact that British illegal blockade unlawfully cut off sales of war materials to the Central Powers and made our enormous war profits dependent upon the purchases made by Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy. Upon the prospect of their success in the War and their ability to prolong the conflict depended the relative amount of profits and the probability of our receiving payment for goods we sold to these Entente Powers."

Of the American press Professor Barnes says:{81}

"The American press had become by 1915-1916 almost uniformly and intolerantly pro-Ally, and in its editorials and its handling of the news scathingly attacked Mr. Wilson's neutral efforts. In some cases Englishmen actually took over the control of some of the leading American dailies . . . The capture of the American press by the Entente is proudly narrated by Sir Gilbert Parker in Harper's Magazine for March, 1918."

Lord Northcliffe of England "spent vast sums of money to secure extensive control over the sentiment of the American press,"{81} and when he had the enormous power of the American press in his control, the noble Lord complimented the American people in the following words:

"Much as I like the Americans, for a people who have boasted of their freedom and democracy, I had never expected to behold on their part so craven a spirit of submission. So far as exercising real independence of judgment and action with respect to war is concerned, I can think of only one people with whom to compare the Americans, namely, the Chinese."{82}

The unkind ridicule of the American people by the noble English Lord was not only gratuitous but ungraceful, to say the least. If the American people were misled by their newspapers, it was not because they were on the same intellectual plane with the Chinese but because there were Englishmen, like Lord Northcliffe, who were unscrupulous enough to use their money for the purpose of misleading the American people. We know well enough that we were the "suckers" in the World War; but it should be remembered that we believed that we were fighting for the lofty ideal of "making the world safe for democracy." We did not know, because the noble English Lord and the newspapers he controlled did not tell us, that the World War was fought to destroy what little democracy was left.

The World War cost the American people 126,000 American boys killed or died and 234,000 wounded. We spent sixty billion dollars and loaned to our Allies eleven billion dollars which they have not repaid (Finland excepted). This enormous amount of money would be sufficient to buy every American farm, together with all the buildings and machinery thereon. It is estimated that before we pay the entire bill, the final amount will be in the neighborhood of about one hundred billion dollars, a rather heavy burden, payment of a large part of which will have to be made by our children. In addition to all the loss of American lives and material losses, one shudders to think of the thousands of heartbroken American mothers, wives and sweethearts, whose loved ones were taken from them and killed in a war, in which we, as a people, had no interest.

The World War not only killed thousands of our youth, not only sent us back thousands of wounded and crippled, not only stripped us in terms of money, not only broke the hearts of thousands of American mothers, wives and sweethearts, but it has rendered the world economically and politically bankrupt; and, let us remember, when the smoke of battle cleared away and the Paris Peace Conference finished, the President of the United States of America returned home virtually a dead man! This was the cruelest of ingratitude in the annals of human history. Those of our former Allies who consider us, the American people, on the level of the Chinese, should remember that our President had returned from Paris virtually a dead man!

The least our former Allies can do for us now is to pay us back the money we loaned them.

United States Representative Knute Hill, speaking in the House of Representatives, summarized the reasons for our entry into the World War and the penalty we have paid, as follows:{83}

"In 1917 we entered the World War 'to make the world safe for democracy.' Our entry into that war not only cost us $50,000,000,000, the loss of millions of the flower of its youth on foreign battlefields and returning veterans gassed and diseased from trenches but also was the chief cause of the 1929 depression. Senators Norris and La Follette were everlastingly right in their contention that the greatest urge for our entry into the World War was not so much the desire to help the down-trodden peoples of Europe as it was to protect the investment of international bankers abroad, the damnable enrichment of war profiteers at home, and to distract the attention of our people from our own economic troubles. Had President Wilson directed his energies and talents and expended the taxpayers' money in the solution of our economic problems, there would have been no depression with its suffering and destitution and bewilderment.

"Is it selfish for the United States to refuse to enter into the world conflict to aid democracies and oppressed people? We tried it once and failed miserably. We had better sweep before our own doors, and the old saying, 'Charity begins at home' applies here. Foreign wars can be none of our affairs."

We have certainly learned our lesson. Hereafter let Europe clean up her own difficulty. We want no more European war and we should fight in no more war to aid leeches and parasites.

1 "Genesis of the World War," p. 317.

2 Ibid, p. 403.

3 Ibid, p. 332.

4 Ibid, pp. 376, 471-476.

5 Ibid, pp. 335-376.

6 Ibid, p. 403. Paléologue assured Sazanov that he was in a position "to give his Excellency formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side."

7 Ibid, p. 209.

8 Ibid, p. 209.

9 Ibid, p. 210.

10 Ibid, p. 210.

11 Ibid, p. 397.

12 Fay in "American Historical Review," January, 1921, p. 235; "The Genesis of the World War," p. 337.

13 M. F. Schilling's "How the War Came," pp. 114-15.

14 "The Genesis of the World War," pp. 339-40.

15 Morhardt's "Les Preuves," p. 275; Ibid, p. 340.

16 E. F. Henderson's "The Verdict of History"; The cause of Sir Edward Grey, p. 192; Ibid, pp. 453-4.

17 August 31, 1914; Ibid, p. 198.

18 Morhardt's "Les Preuves," pp. 341-2.

19 Dobrorolski, "Die Mobilizmachung der Russichen Armee," 1914, pp. 10, 27, 29; Ibid, p. 347.

20 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 362.

21 Die Kriegsschuldfrage, November, 1926; Ibid, p. 363.

22 "Falsification of the Russian Orange Book," p. 531; Ibid, p. 285.

23 Morhardt, pp. 295-6; Ibid, 285.

24 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 354.

25 Ibid, p. 404.

26 Ibid, p. 147.

27 Ibid, p. 404.

28 Ibid, p. 405; British Documents, No. 320(b); "Falsification of the Russian Orange Book," pp. 38-40; Morhardt, p. 275.

29 "Falsification of the Russian Orange Book," pp. 53-4.

30 "The Outbreak of the World War," p. 200; "The Genesis of the World War," p. 334.

31 British Blue Book, No. 47; Ibid, p. 335.

32 F. Nielson's "How Diplomats Make War," p. 328; U. S. Senate Document, "Justice for Hungary," No. 436, 1923, p. 11; Birinyi's "The Tragedy of Hungary," p. 128.

33 "The Genesis of the World War," pp. 232-3.

34 Ibid, p. 253.

35 Ibid, p. 350.

36 Ibid, p. 285.

37 Ibid, p. 283; "The Outbreak of the War," p. 284.

38 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 284.

39 Ibid, p. 285.

40 Ibid, p. 285.

41 Ibid, p. 337.

42 Ibid, p. 453.

43 Ibid, p. 453.

44 Ibid, p. 284.

45 The Austrian Red Book; Ibid, p. 180.

46 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 181.

47 "The Outbreak of the World War," p. 351; Ibid, p. 27.

48 Ibid, p. 351; "The Genesis of the World War," p. 282.

49 Ibid, p. 291.

50 St. John, 11:35.

51 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 288.

51-a Ibid, pp. 422-3.

52 Ibid, pp. 398-9.

53 Ibid, p. 389.

54 Ibid, pp. 501-2.

55 Ibid, p. 409.

56 Ibid, p. 411.

57 Ibid, p. 409.

58 Ibid, p. 411; British Documents, No. 319, p. 447.

59 "Falsification of the Russian Orange Book," pp. 60-61; "The Genesis of the World War," p. 415.

60 "Falsification of the Russian Orange Book," pp. 58-63; "The Genesis of the World War," p. 415.

61 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 550.

62 Ibid, p. 549.

63 Ibid, p. 547; "Twenty-five Years," Vol. I, pp. 303, 316.

64 Ibid, p. 513; British Blue Book, No. 115; British Documents, No. 351.

65 British Documents, No. 351; Ibid, p. 553.

66 British Documents, No. 448; Ibid, p. 553.

67 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 514.

68 Ibid, p. 515.

69 Ibid, p. 517; British Documents, No. 487.

70 "The Genesis of the World War," p. 517.

71 Ibid, p. 556; British Documents, No. 580.

72 Belgian Grey Book, No. 40; Ibid, pp. 556-7.

73 "The Genesis of the World War," pp. 416-7.

74 Ibid, p. 461-2.

75 Ibid, p. 464.

76 C. W. Bridge, "England's War Preparations" in the "Kriegsschuldefrage," July, 1924; Ibid, p. 465.

77 "The Genesis of the World War," pp. 597-8.

78 Ibid, p. 598.

79 Ibid, p. 598.

80 Ibid, p. 609.

81 Ibid, p. 612.

82 Ibid, p. 614. Also U. S. Senator Nye's speech in Congressional Record, January 17, 1936, pp. 557-574. In comparing the American people with the Chinese, the noble English Lord probably had in mind the type of abnormal people who are classified by American psychologists as "Mongolian idiots," having flat, expressionless faces, are "tongue suckers," "fissured tongued," defective in intelligence, and imbecile. (See "The Psychology of Abnormal People" by John J. B. Morgan, second edition, pages 320-321.) No doubt there are still men in England, occupying high political positions, who hold the same opinion of the American people, otherwise they would not be attempting to trick us into another world war which is destined to destroy Christian civilization.

83 Congressional Record, April 12, 1938.