America's Retreat From Victory
by Senator Joe McCarthy
BACKGROUND
LEADING UP TO THE MARSHALL SPEECH
On June 14, 1951, I reviewed the public career of George
Catlett Marshall from the beginning of World War II before
the United States Senate. It was an exhaustive review, running
to 72,000 words, drawn from the acknowledged sources of
this period.
Among the questions raised by that speech were these:
What were McCarthy's motives' Why did McCarthy single out
the Secretary of Defense and spend so much time preparing
such a searching documentation of his history?
Those questions recalled the advice given me by some of my
friends before I gave the history of George Marshall."
Don't do it, McCarthy," they said. "Marshall has been built
into such a great hero in the eyes of the people that you will
destroy yourself politically if you lay hands on the laurels of
this great man."
My answer to those well-meaning friends was that the
reason the world is in such a tragic state today is that too
many politicians have been doing only that which they consid-
er politically wise -- only that which is safe for their own
political fortunes.
My discussion of General Marshall's career arose naturally
and inevitably out of a long and anxious study of the retreat
from victory which this Administration has been beating since
1945. In company with so many of my fellow citizens I have
become alarmed and dismayed over our moral and material
enfeeblement.
The fact that 152 million American people are officially
asked by the party in power to adopt Marshall's global strategy
during a period of time when the life of our civiliza-
tion hangs in the balance would seem to make it imperative
that his complete record be subjected to the searching light of
public scrutiny.
As a backdrop for the history of Marshall which I gave on
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June 14, there is the raw, harsh fact that since World War II
the free world has been losing 100 million people per year to
international Communism. If I had named the men responsible
for our tremendous loss, all of the Administration apologists
and the camp-following elements of press and radio led by the
Daily Worker would have Screamed "the Big Lie," 'lrresponsi-
ble," "smear," "Congressional immunity," etc., etc., etc. How-
ever; it was the Truman branch of the Democratic Party
meeting at Denver, Colorado, which named the men responsi-
ble for the disaster which they called a "great victory" -- Dean
Gooderham Acheson and George Catlett Marshall. By what
tortured reasoning they arrived at the conclusion that the loss
of 100 million people a year to Communism was a "great
victory," was unexplained.
The general picture of our steady, constant retreat from
victory, with the same men always found at the time and place
where disaster strikes America and success comes to Soviet
Russia, would inevitably have caused me, or someone else
deeply concerned with the history of this time, to document
the acts of those molding and shaping the history of the world
over the past decade. However, an occurrence during the
MacArthur investigation was the immediate cause of my deci-
sion to give the Senate and the country the history of Mar-
shall.
A deeply disturbed Senator from the Russell Committee
came to my office for information. "McCarthy," he said, "I
have always considered Marshall as one of our great heroes
and I am sure that he would knowingly do no wrong. But,
McCarthy," he said, "tell me who prejudiced the thinking of
this great man? Why, for example, did he keep from Roosevelt
the complete and correct intelligence reports at Yalta? Why
did he, as Roosevelt's military adviser, approve that Yalta
agreement which was drafted by Hiss, Gromyko, and Jebb?
Who persuaded him to disregard the intelligence report of 50
of his own officers, all with the rank of colonel or above -- an
intelligence report which urged a course directly contrary to
what was done at Yalta and confirmed at Potsdam?"
He handed a copy of that report to me and asked: "Why
did a man of Marshall's intelligence ignore such a report as
this compiled by 50 of his own top intelligence officers?" The
report, dated April 12, 1945, read as follows:
The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be
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a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect
of which would be felt for decades to come. Its military
significance at this stage of the war would be relatively un-
important * * * The entry of the Soviet Russia into the Asiatic
war would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effect-
ly as our own position is now destroyed in Europe east of
the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic.If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose
her independence to become the Poland of Asia; Korea,
the Asiatic Rumania; Manchuria, the Soviet Bulgaria. Whe-
ther more than a nominal China would exist after the im-
pact of the Russia armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang
may well have to depart and a Chinese Soviet government
may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recog-
nize.
To take a line of action which would save few lives now,
and only a little time -- at an unpredictable cost in lives
treasure, and honor in the future -- and simultaneously de-
stroy our ally China, would be an act of treachery that
would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world
peace a tragic farce.
Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to
Destroy China. This would certainly injure the material and
moral position of the United States in Asia.
Marshall had ignored this report.
The Senator went on. "McCarthy," he said, "who of evil
allegiance to the Kremlin sold him on the disastrous Marshall
Mission to China, where Marshall described one of his own
acts as follows: 'As Chief-of-Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist
divisions. Now with a stroke of a pen I disarm them'?
"When that was done," he asked, "who then persuaded
Marshall to open Kalgan Mountain Pass, with the result that
the Chinese Communists could make contact with the Rus-
ians and receive the necessary arms and ammunition to
overrun all of China?
"McCarthy, who on earth could have persuaded Marshall
to side with Acheson and against American interests on the
question of Formosa and the use of the Chinese Nationalist
troops?"
Upon searching for the answers for the Senator, I found to
my surprise that no one had ever written the history of
Marshall -- Marshall, who, by the alchemy of propaganda,
became the "greatest living American" and the recently pro-
claimed "master of global strategy" by and for the party in
power. In view of the fact that the committee, the Congress,
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and the American people were being called upon either to
endorse or reject Marshall's "global strategy," I felt it was
urgent that such a study be made and submitted to the
Congress and the people.
I decided that the record of Marshall's unbroken series of
decisions and acts, contributing so greatly to the strategy of
defeat, should be given not from the pens and lips of his
critics but from sources friendly to him. I drew on the written
record -- on the memoirs of the principal actors in the great
events of the last ten years. I drew heavily from the books out
of which the history of these times will be written for the next
500 years; I drew from the pens of Winston Churchill, Admir-
al William Leahy, Cordell Hull, Henry L. Stimson, James F.
Brynes, Sumner Welles, Edward Stettinius, Jr., Robert Sher-
wood, Hanson Baldwin, General H.H. Arnold, General Claire
Chennault, General Lucius Clay, General Mark Clark, Gener-
al John R. Deane, General Omar Bradley, and others. No
one of them alone was trying to or did give anything re-
motely approaching a complete record of Marshall. The
picture emerges, however, as we piece together their recollec-
tion of the events in which he figures -- oftentimes fragmen-
tary, never directly uncomplimentary, but when fitted
together, pointing unerringly to one conclusion.
It is from those sources, plus the State Department's record
taken from Marshall's own files, that the picture becomes
generally complete.
As I commenced to write this history of Marshall, one of the
first things that impressed me was that Marshall, one of the
most powerful men in the world during the past ten years, is
one of the least known public figures. He shuns publicity.
Back in 1943, Sidney Shalett, eulogizing Marshall in the New
York Times magazine, quoted him as having said: "No pub-
licity will do me no harm, but some publicity will do me no
good." This perhaps is why Marshall stands alone among the
wartime leaders in that he has never written his own memoirs
or allowed anyone else to write his story for him.
One of the criticisms of the June 14 speech was that it was
inadequate because of the omission of any references to Mar-
shall's history prior to the winter of 1941 and 1942. I think
this criticism is perhaps well taken. For that reason, I shall
here attempt to cover briefly the pertinent aspects of Mar-
shall's earlier history.
He was graduated from Virginia Military Institute and soon
4
thereafter entered the army as a second lieutenant. He served
creditably in World War I, finally at the end of that war
reaching a position on General Pershing's staff which brought
him the friendship of that great soldier. The postwar years are
more pertinent because, having reverted to his permanent rank
as Captain, Marshall underwent the usual disappointments
and the boredom of our peacetime army. In his case, the
disappointments were perhaps more grievous than with most
of his fellow officers.
In the American Mercury for March 1951, Walter Trohan
published a sketch of General Marshall's
career under the title "The Tragedy of George Marshall."
The article is a study of Marshall's army life prior to acces-
sion to the office of Chief of Staff. Trohan deals with what
must have been the gravest disappointment that befell Mar-
shall. This happened in 1933. According to Trohan, Marshall,
impatient over slow promotion, besought the inter-
cession of General Pershing with General Douglas MacArthur,
who was Chief of Staff. Trohan puts it:
McArthur was ready to oblige, but insisted that the promo-
tion go through regular channels. Pershing agreed, confident
Marshall could clear the hurdles. Friendly examination of
the Marshall record showed what his superiors regarded as
insufficient time with troops. MacArthur proposed to rem-
edy this, giving him command of the Eighth Regiment at
Fort Screven, Ga., one of the finest regiments in the army.
Marshall was moved up from lieutenant colonel to colo-
nal, but his way to a general's stars appeared to be blocked
forever when the Inspector General reported that under
one year of Marshal's command the Eighth Regiment had
dropped from one of the best regiments in the army to one
of the worst. MacArthur regretfully informed Pershing that
the report made promotion impossible. To this day Mar-
shall is uneasy in the presence of MacArthur.
A footnote to that version appears in the quasi-biography
written by Mrs. George C. Marshall in 1946 and published
under the title Together. After Colonel Marshall had been
removed from command at Fort Screven, he left far Fort
Moultrie 1n South Carolina. The residence of the Command-
ing Officer of that post was a large, rambling structure, replete
with 42 French doors Opening on two verandas. Mrs. Mar-
shall, as she reports it, had barely provided 325 yards of
curtains for the French doors when orders came transferring
her husband to Chicago as senior instructor of the Illinois
5
National Guard. Mrs. Marshall describes what ensued in these
words on page 18 of Together:
He [Colonel Marshall) wrote to General MacArthur, then
Chief of Staff, that be was making the first request for spec-
cial consideration that he had ever made while in the Army.
After four years as an instructor at Fort Benning, he felt it
would be fatal to his future if he was taken away from
troops and placed on detached service instructing again. He
asked that he might remain with his regiment...
We left for Chicago within a week. The family, my
daughter and two sons, waited in Baltimore until we could
find a place to live. Those first months in Chicago I shall
never forget. George had a gray, drawn look which I had never
seen before and have seldom seen since.
This was in 1933. Six years later, Marshall, who had been
relieved of the command of a regiment by Douglas MacAr-
thur, would be placed by Roosevelt in command of the entire
United States Army. What happened to change the unsuccess-
ful regimental commander into the first choice of the President
for the highest army post still remains somewhat shrouded in
mystery. Did Marshall rise during those six pears on sheer
merit? Was his military worth so demonstrated that he became
the inevitable choice for the Chief of Staff upon the retirement
of Malin Craig? Or were there political considerations that
turned failure into success?
During the early years of the late depression the army was
extensively employed by President Roosevelt in setting up his
social welfare projects. The army supplied much of the high
personnel for WPA. Many officers who there established con-
tact with Harry L. Hopkins later reaped high command as a
result. So it was with the CCC -- Civilian Conservation Corps.
At Fort Screven, Marshall had under his command the CCC
activities of Georgia and Northern Florida. At Moultrie he
directed the CCC in South Carolina. As we read Mrs. Mar-
shall's biography, we note that Marshall devoted care and
attention to his labors with the CCC. Mrs. Marshall wrote:
I accompanied him on many of his inspection trips to
these camps and always attended the opening of a new
camp, at which he made quite a gala occasion.
That year, one of the camps under Marshall's supervision
6
was rated the best in the United States. His activities in charge
of CCC camps commended Marshall to the favorable notice
of those persons in Washington interested in the CCC camps.
Among them were Mrs. Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, and Au-
brey Williams, head of the National Youth Administration.
However short Colonel Marshall's record as a regimental
Commander may have fallen in the eyes of the Inspector
General and Chief of Staff, his CCC exertions made him
friends who perhaps were far more influential in his later
career.
After 1933, when Marshall failed to he promoted to general
because the Inspector General of the Army reported be was
incompetent to handle troops, Marshall apparently discovered
that there were other avenues to promotion and power outside
narrow military channels.
I think it is necessary, if we are fully to understand General
Marshall, to see the disappointed and frustrated 52-year-old
of 1933 in the background of the world-famous Chief of-Staff of 1945.
At what point and with whom did he forge
the alliances that suddenly were to propel him out of his
obscurity into high position in 1939? Marshall, incidentally, is
practically the only military man in the history of the world
who received high rank with such a lack of combat duties. I
know of no other general who served in the military through
as many wars as Marshall with less participation in the com-
bat of a single one.
In 1936 he became a brigadier and was appointed to
command the Seventh Infantry Brigade at Vancouver Bar-
racks, Washington, an old frontier post across the river from
Portland, Oregon. It was at Vancouver that Marshall first
reached the attention of the general public. His first appear-
ance in the New York Times Index occurs in the fall of 1936.
It grew out of the circumstances that the Soviet transpolar
fliers, headed for a reception in Oakland, landed instead on
the small airfield of Vancouver Barracks, where General Mar-
shall was the commanding officer.
General Marshall came to Washington in the summer of
1938 as Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of War Planning.
In less than a year's time, President Roosevelt sent for him to
announce that he was to succeed General Craig upon his
retirement as Chief of Staff in September. It came as a shock,
because the public had expected General Hugh Drum to be
appointed. Roosevelt had jumped Marshall over the heads of
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20 major-generals and 14 senior brigadiers. The appointment
was generally accepted as a personal one. Roosevelt, it was
assumed, had followed his own judgment rather than
the consensus of high army authorities, active and retired. We
know from Robert Sherwood's book Roosevelt and Hopkins
that Hopkins favored Marshall's appointment. It was
also favored by Mrs. Roosevelt.
The part of General Marshall's career as Chief of Staff that
relates to the activities of the enemies of our country
has received too little notice. We know that the army, while
Marshall was Chief of Staff, commissioned known Commu-
nists during World War II.*
While Marshall was Chief of Staff, there occurred the
famous incident of the attempted destruction of the files,
wherein the Army, acting under the highest authority, set out
illegally to destroy the Army's counterintelligence files on sub-
versives, including civilians as well as officers and men. That
unlawful attempt to protect enemies of our country, men who
are by definition servants of Soviet interests was frustrated
only through the vigilance of Senator Styles Bridges of New
Hampshire. I do not know whether the motion so to protect
Communists in the army originated with General Marshall. I
do know that it could hardly have reached the stage of action
without his approval.
This generally hits the high points in Marshall's history up
to the point where I picked up in my speech of June 14.
However, I note that in the history of Marshall covering the
past ten years, I omitted a number of points of some interest
during his tenure as Secretary of State. For example, during
this time a Senate committee sent him a confidential report,
which is here reproduced:
CONFIDENTIAL
June 10, 1947
Memorandum to Secretary of State George C. Marshall
It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation
to call your attention to a condition that developed and still
flourishes in the State Department under the administration
of Dean Acheson.
It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program
being carried out not only to Protect Communist personnel
* Special Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of
Representatives, February-March hearings, pp. 3591-3593.
8
in high places to reduce security and intelligence pro-
tection to a nullity.
Regarding the much-publicized MARZANI case, the evi-
dence brought out at his trial was well known to State
Department officers, who ignored it and refused to act for
a full year.
MARANZI and several other Department officials, with
full knowledge of the State Department, and with Gov-
ernment time and money, promoted a scheme called PRES-
ENTATION, Inc., which contracted with a Communist
dominated organization to disseminate propaganda.
Security objections to these and other even more danger-
ous developments were rebuked by high administrative
officials; and there followed the substitution of unqualified
men for the competent, highly respected personnel who
theretofore held the intelligence and security assignments
in the Department. The new chief of Controls is a man
utterly devoid of background and experience for the job
who is, and at the time of his appointment was known to
those who appointed him to be a cousin and close associate
of a suspected Soviet espionage agent. The next develop-
ment was the refusal of the FBI, G-2, ONI. and other
federal agencies to continue the wholehearted cooperation
they had for years extended to the State Department.
On file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary re-
port of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United
States which involves a large number of State Department
employees, some in high official positions. This report has
been challenged and ignored by those charged with the re-
sponsibility of administering the Department, with the ap-
parent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case
break before the State Department acts, it will be a national
disgrace.
Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving
the connection of State Department employees and officials
with this Soviet espionage ring. Despite this, only two per-
sons, one Of whom is MARZANI, were released under the
McCarran rider of their subversive activity. [Nine
other named persons] are only a few of the hundreds now
employed in varying capacities who are protected and al-
lowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an
obvious hazard to national security. There is also the exten-
sive employment in highly classified positions of admitted
homosexuals, who are historically known to be security
risks.
The War and Navy Departments have been thwarted for
a year in their efforts to carry out the German Scientist
program. They are blocked by one man in the State De-
9
partment, a protege of Acheson named --, who is
also the chief instrument in the subverting of the overall
security program. This deplorable condition runs all the way up and down
the line. Assistant Secretary Braden also surrounded him-
self with men like----- and -----, who bears a notori-
ous international reputation, The network also extends into
the office of Assistant Secretary Benton.
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
[Signatures of Committee members]
This report was completely ignored by Marshall. He failed
to take any action of any kind on it. In fact, he did not even
give the Committee the courtesy of acknowledging the report.
He did act, however, and very promptly, in another case.
On Friday, June 16, 1948, while was Secretary of
State, Robert C. Alexander, who was employed in the Visa
Division of the State Department, testified under oath that
Communists were being allowed to enter the United States
under the aegis of the United Nations. Marshall immediately
denied the truth of this statement and set up a committee
which denounced Alexander's allegations as "irresponsible and
untrue."
On September 9, 1948, Alexander received a letter from the
State Department which contained the following:
The Department proposes to take appropriate disciplinary
actions against you... for misconduct in office and dere-
liction of duty.
The intended action grows out of your testimony and infer-
ences arising from your statements made before the staff
of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
On June 30, 1949, Senator McCarran wrote Admiral Hil-
lenkoetterr, who was then head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, to inquire whether Communists actually were coming
into the country through the United Nations. He wrote as
follows:
Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter;
There is attached to this letter a list of the names of 100
persons.
This is a partial list of those to whom visas have
10
been issued for admission into the United States either as
affiliates of international organizations or as officials or
employees of foreign governments, and their families....
Many of the names given in McCarran'a letter were names
which had previously been referred to by Mr. Alexander.
I now quote two pertinent paragraphs from Admiral Hillen-
koetter's answer:
Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list
have reportedly or allegedly been in active work
for the intelligence services of their respective countries.
Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached
Letters are high-ranking Commumst Party officials.
Shortly thereafter, Admiral Hillenkoetter was removed as
head of the Central Intelligence Agency and assigned to a
post of duty in the Western Pacific.
Another incident in the Marshall history, omitted from the
June 14 speech, is described by George Morgenstern in his
book Pearl Harbor as follows:
The key witness on the "winds" message, Capt. Safford,
received special attention from Sonnett and Hewitt, but
steadfastly stuck to his story that the "winds" signal had
been intercepted, that be bad handled it, and that he had
seen that it reached his superiors. (pp. 202-203)
The "winds" message was a Japanese coded message as to
the time and target of their attack.
Morgenstern then describes the pressure put upon Safford
to change his testimony. On page 204, the following is found:
Despite all this pressure upon him, Safford, when he was
called as a witness before the congressional committee on
February 1, 1946, opened his statement with the flat as-
sertion: "There was a 'winds' message. It meant war -- and
we knew it meant war."
Safford said that the 'Winds" message was part of a
Japanese overseas news broadcast from station J-A-P in
Tokyo on Thursday, December 4, 1941, at 8:30 am
Washington time.
According to Morgenstern, page 216, Safford testified that
he had been told by W. F. Friedman, chief army cryptoana-
11
lyst, that the 'winds" message had been destroyed prior to the
Pearl Harbor investigation "on direct orders from Chief of
Staff Marshall" However, for some mysterious reason, Fried-
man was never called either to support or repudiate this
testimony of Safford's.
Another interesting point brought out by Morgenstern on
Pages 201 and 202 was that Marshall, fearing that Thomas E.
Dewey, in the 1944 campaign, was about to expose Marshall's
part in the Pearl Harbor disaster, sent to him a staff officer
with letters from Marshall, and persuaded Dewey that such an
exposure would inform Japan that we had broken her code
and would thereby impair our military efforts. Dewey was
apparently convinced and, being a loyal American, did not
mention this matter during the campaign. On page 202, Mor-
genstern points out that this was a deliberate deception prac-
ticed upon Dewey, because Marshall knew the Germans had
found out as early as 1941 that we had broken the Japanese
code and had so informed the Japanese.
Incidentally, I do not know what has happened to Captain
Safford, but I do not recall having read of his being promot-
ed.
Another item of interest in regard to Marshall is found in
the Readers Digest of January 1944.
The late Frederick C. Painton was describing an interview
had with General Marshall by 60 Anglo-American correspon-
dents in Algiers:
A door opened, a hush fell, General Marshall walked in.
He looked around the room, his eyes calm, his face im-
passive. "To save time," he said, "I'm going to ask each of
you what questions you have in mind" His eyes turned to
the fist correspondent. "What's your question?' A pene-
trating query was put; General Marshall nodded and went
on to the next man - and so around the room, until 60 cor-
respondents had asked challenging questions ranging from
major strategy to technical details of the war on a dozen
fronts.
General Marshall looked off into space for perhaps 30
seconds. Then he began. For nearly 40 minutes he spoke.
His talk was a smooth, connected, briliantly clear narrative
that encompassed the war. And this narrative, smooth
enough to be a chapter in a book, included a complete
answer to every question we had asked.
But what astounded us most was this: as he reached the
point in his narrative which dwelt upon a specific question,
12
he looked directly at the man who had asked the question!
Afterward I heard many comments from the correspon-
dents. Some said they had just encountered the greatest
military mind in history. Others exclaimed over the en-
cydopedic detail Marshall could remember. All agreed on
one thing: "That's the most brilliant interview I have ever
attended in my life."
The above interview becomes extremely interesting when compared
to Marshall's inability to recall what he was doing on
the morning of Pearl Harbor. Originally, Marshall testified
that he was out horseback riding and for that reason could not
be contacted. Later, he testified his memory had been re-
freshed and that he actually had not been horseback riding but
was at home with his wife. The third version of where the
Army Chief of Staff was on that fateful morning is contained
in Arthur Upton Pope's book Litvinoff, in which the diary
account of Litvinoff's trip from Russia to the United States
shows that Marshall was meeting Litvinoff at the airport on
Pearl Harbor morning. While the question of whether Mar-
was riding horseback, or with hid wife, or with Litvinoff
seems unimportant today, it does form a very interesting
comparison of Marshall's memory on these two occasions.
From here we proceed to the history of Marshall which I
gave on June 14, 1951.
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I BEGIN MY review of George Catlett Marshall's history with
the winter of 1941 and 1942, when the comprehensive out-
lines of Anglo-American strategy were drawn. During the
Christmas holidays of 1941 Winston Churchill, attended by
his military advisers, came to Washington and held a series of
conferences at the White House with President Roosevelt and
his military advisers. Japan had struck at Pearl Harbor on the
7th of December. Our fortunes were then joined with those of
the British and the lesser powers engaged against Japan and
Germany. We faced, for the first time in our history, global
responsibilities. We were everywhere on the defensive. The
British occupied a precarious foothold in Egypt. We still held
Corregidor and Bataan, although the end there was in sight.
Singapore had not yet fallen, but the Japanese were well
advanced in their southward drive. Germany, master of the
continent as far as the Pyrenees and the North Cape, was still
marching toward the east into Russia.
The President and the Prime Minister, with their military
counselors, agreed then upon a strategic plan embracing the
globe. Included in this plan was a provision for the invasion
of the mainland of Europe at some time during 1943. It was
rightly considered that we would lack the men and the equip-
ment to cross the Channel before 1943. What came to be
known as the second front was allotted its appropriate place
in the world-wide scale as this conference came to a close in
the middle of January. It was at this time that the enormously
destructive battle of the Atlantic began -- the ruthless subma-
rine warfare aimed at our shipping -- which was to hamper
our war effort far mere than the conferees at the White
House had expected.
The Soviet Union, its armies reeling back, had been be-
seeching the British since the preceding summer to attack
Germany across the Channel as a means of relieving their dire
pressure. After the White House conference known as Arcadia
ended, the efforts of the Russians to promote a diversion in
Western Europe were redoubled. The pressure was not
14
alone maintained against our government; it took the form
of public propaganda, in which the Communists both of
England and America, and their friends and well-wishers, took
a leading part.
Sometime between the end of the Arcadia Conference and
the first of April, General Marshall, who was then, as we
remember, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, had prepared
in the War Department Planning Section a plan for the
invasion of Western Europe in 1942. This planning section
was under the command of Col. Dwight D. Eisenhow-
er. I might say, parenthetically, that at Arcadia in a closed
session among the President, the Prime Minister, and Ambas-
sador Litvinoff, the President had, with characteristic impul-
siveness, given Litvinoff some cause to hope that the western
allies might find it possible to mount this invasion in 1942. At
Arcadia the President had proposed an intermediate attack in
North Africa for the purpose of gaining command of the
Mediterranean and threatening the Nazis from the south. It
was over these two projects that the violent disputes of the
next three months were to wage, disputes largely hidden from the
public at the time, but in which General Marshall and the Prime
Minister played the leading roles.
The plan for a "second front now" has been described by
the late Secretary Stimson as "the brain child of the American
Army." There can be no doubt that it was General Marshall's
plan. He fought for it with the utmost vigor, a vigor going far
beyond the call of duty of a purely military adviser. As Mr.
Churchill once put it in a cable to Mr. Roosevelt, the matter
was "a political, more than a military, issue." The text of
this cable may be found on page 43 of Mr. Churchill's book,
the Hinge of Fate. By March 9, 1942, we are told by Mr.
Robert Sherwood, the President had fallen in to some extent
with the Marshall plan, cabling Churchill on that date:
I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front (on the European continent) this summer.
By the first of April, Mr. Roosevelt had been induced, as
Sherwood explains on page 521 of his book Roosevelt and
Hopkins, by Stimson, Marshall, and Hopkins to supersede
the North African venture known as Gymnast in favor of the
Trans-channel operation. By then, as Sherwood puts it, "Roose-
velt was attaching great importance to the political impor-
15
tance of this in relation to Russia." Hopkins and Marshall
were sent to London to persuade Churchill. The Americans
found Churchill reluctant. With his customary eloquence, the
Prime Minister explored the difficulties of the operation. They
lacked the landing craft necessary, they lacked the air
and the naval support. The venture would be costly, the
Prime Minister believed, and he foresaw the channel turned
into a "river of Allied blood." Should it fail, said Churchill, it
would not only expose our friends on the Continent to great
disappointment, it would hearten the Nazis and prejudice
subsequent attempts to invade the Continent. However, the
British agreed to give the matter careful study, which they
did.
The American strategists continued hurriedly and confident-
ly to plan for a "second front now" until early in June, when
disquieting news reached Washington with the arrival of Lord
Louis Mountbatten. He reported to the President that the
British military experts could find no feasible method by
which the invasion could be mounted. By this time the inva-
sion bore the name Sledgehammer. Churchill followed Mount-
batten to Washington, and under his representations of the
difficulties, the President weakened, returning to his preference
for Gymnast. When the President sought to moderate Mar-
shall's views, "he met with," as Mr. Stimson put it, on page
424 of his book On Active Service in Peace and War, "a
rather robust opposition." The general quickly submitted a
new paper in support of the "second front now" and against
Gymnast.
On July 10, as Stimson reports it, Marshall returned from a
White House conference "very stirred up and emphatic over a
British War Cabinet paper vetoing Sledgehammer and calling
for Gymnast." Still following Mr. Stimson's version of the
occasion, Marshall
proposed a showdown which I cordially endorsed. As the
British will not go through with what they agreed to, we
will turn our back on them and take up the war with Japan.
Stimson in retrospect was "not entirely pleased with his part
in this venture," it should be noted. The Army Chief of Staff
acquired the support of his colleagues, Admiral Ernest J. King
and General H. H. (Hap) Arnold. This is the appropriate
time to point out that during the war Admiral King's preoccu-
pations were almost wholly with the Pacific theater. He had
16
little or no interest in the strategy of the war in Europe and
Asia and only exercised himself there when the claims of
those theaters infringed on his own supply of ships and men.
I find no evidence in the sources I have consulted that Gen-
eral Arnold ever took a leading part in thee strategical questions.
To all intents and purposes it is quite clear that General Marshall
spoke the voice of the Joint Chiefs in matters of
over-all strategy. Returning to the Sledgehammer quarrel,
Marshall submitted to the President a paper, signed by all
three chiefs, proposing that we withdraw from the
war in Europe unless the British acceded to his plan. Here I
quote Mr. Stimson, page 425:
The President asserted that he himself was absolutely sound on Bolero (Sledgehammer), which must go ahead unremittingly, but he did not like the manner of the memo-
randum in regard to the Pacific, saying that it was a little like taking up your dishes and going away."
Stimson came to describe as a "bluff by Marshall
was never tried. Furthermore, Stimson knew that the President
had a "lingering predilection for the Mediterranean," and the
Prime Minister had shown on his last visit that he, too, knew
the President's feeling; on June 21 he "had taken up Gym-
nast, knowing full well I am sure that it was the President's great
secret baby." The quotation is from Stimson.
Mr. Sherwood, in commenting on these events - page
594 -- recalls that Roosevelt described the Marshall showdown
as "a red herring," a phrase that has a familiar ring; Sher-
wood does not agree with Stimson that it was a tactical
maneuver in the struggle between Marshall and Churchill,
saying, "It is my impression that the plan was far more than a
bluff in General Marshall's mind and in Admiral King's. Indeed
the first step in it -- the assault of Guadalcanal - was approved on June
25, the last day of Churchill's stay in Washington."
The President resolved this crisis by dispatching Marshall,
Hopkins, and King to London to have it finally out with the
Prime Minister and his advisers. They arrived in Scotland on a
Saturday, finding the Prime Minister's train and an invita-
tion to Chequers, the Prime Minister's country place, awaiting
them. Rather mystifyingly Marshall, who was so obviously the
guest of the Prime Minister, bluntly declined his invitation to
stop at Chequers and insisted on proceeding directly to Lon-
17
don. Churchill protested this "rudeness" in talks with Hop-
kins. Marshall, it was clear, did not want to put himself under
the persuasive fire of Churchill. Sherwood testifies that those
were tense days for the Anglo-American Alliance. Marshall
found heavy going in London. Before long Admiral King had
been alienated by representations of the Royal Navy that the
French coast would become a lee shore in September and
hence difficult to invade.
What was perhaps the most crushing argument against
Sledgehammer was dealt by a general who was taking no sides
in the political question, Mark Clark. Clark was then in
command of all American Army forces in the British Isles.
Rather belatedly, it seems, he was called before the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and asked by Marshall what American forces
could be contributed to a "second front now." I quote from
page 34 of Clark's book Calculated Risk his version of that
occasion:
I pointed out that all we could count on using would be
the Thirty-fourth Division then in North Ireland. * * *The
Thirty-fourth, however, had little amphibious training, it
lacked antiaircraft support and it had no tanks. The First
Armored Division, also in Ireland, was not yet fully
equipped, nor would any other units scheduled to arrive
before September 15 be prepared for battle. * * * There
would be a difficult problem getting the men and equip
ment together and * * * there seemed to be no possibility
that invasion boats would be ready * * * to say nothing of
bad weather conditions prevailing at that time of year * * *
the American forces will be ready to contribute compara-
tively little until spring of 1943.
With Clark's report it at once becomes evident that Mar-
shall had virtually nothing to contribute in support of his
plan. What he was, in effect, doing was calling upon the
British to execute an operation in which they firmly disbe-
lieved with scarcely any support from his own forces.
I leave it to the reader to characterize the general's zeal. We
were to learn later that as far along as the spring of 1943, the
Nazis had 1,300,000 troops in France and the Low Coun-
tries.
It should here be noted that the first troops that we sent
abroad in 1942 were, as we discovered in North Africa,
insufficiently trained for combat. It is no reflection upon them
to say that in the first weeks of the American Corps' venture
18
into battle they did not behave as hardened veterans. Indeed,
General McNair, who unhappily lost his life by misdirected
American air fire in the Normandy invasion, observed to
General Clark after a visit to the North African front, "the
American soldiers are not fighting in Tunisia." This may be found on
page 168 of General Clark's memoirs. He qualified that in favor
of the First Division. McNair attributed their lack of battle
stability to the failure to inculcate discipline in their training
here at home. We have been assured times without number that General
Marshall's greatest achievement in World War II was the organization and
training of our armies. When our forces in
North Africa had become battle-hardened and General Clark
and General Patton had put them under advanced training,
they behaved in the best tradition of the American Army. But
what would have happened had we thrown the green troops
of Kasserine Pass against Hitler's Panzers in the fall of 1942?
We find a curious retrospective glance at that incident in
Sherwood's recollections, where, on page 807, he quotes Hop-
kins to this effect:
In trying to figure out whether we could have gotten
across the channel successfully in 1942 or 1943, you have
got to answer the unanswerable question as to whether
Eisenhower, Bradley, Spaatz, Patton, Bedell Smith, and also
Montgomery and Tedder and a lot of others could have
handled the big show as they would if they hadn't had the
experience fighting Germany in North Africa and Sicily.
So at London in July of 1942, the plan of the "master of
global strategy" went awry and the Combined Chiefs settled
on Gynmast. Sherwood recalls that "General Marshall had
firmly opposed it and so had General Eisenhower, who is quoted
as having described the day when the decision was
made by Roosevelt as possibly the blackest day in history."
In this connection, I should like to summon as a witness
Hanson W. Baldwin, the distinguished military critic of the
New York Times, whose strategic insights are universally
recognized.
I think it goes without saying that the wisdom of Marshall's
fervent determination to cross the Channel in the fall of 1942
or the spring of 1943 is open to grave doubts. It was, in fact,
the first of a series of major decisions made by this "master of
global strategy," some of them producing consequences which
19
today increasingly threaten the well-being and survival of
West. In his book Great Mistakes of the War Baldwin says on
page 33:
In retrospect it is now obvious that our concept of invading
Western Europe in 1942 was fantastic; our deficiencies in
North Africa, which was a much-needed training school for
our troops, proved that. The British objection to a 1943
Cross-channel operation was also soundly taken militarily;
we would have had in that year neither the trained divi-
sions, the equipment, the planes, the experience, nor (par-
ticularly) the landing craft to have invaded the most
strongly held part of the Continent against an enemy whose
strength was far greater than it was a year later.
Baldwin's estimate goes far to support Churchill's objections
that a disaster on the French coast due to a hasty, reckless
invasion might have proved "the only way in which we could possibly lose
this war." That Churchill remark appears on page 590 of Sherwood.
It was at this time, whether or not because of the fervor with
which Marshall pushed his plan, that Roosevelt superseded
him in the military circle around the White House. The
President chose Admiral Leahy, a naval officer of eminent
achievements and the saltiest of common sense, as his personal
Chief of Staff. Leahy became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
and thus, nominally, Marshall's superior, although, as we shall
see, Marshall overcame him at several of the most critical
junctures. Although Leahy came on the scene, having been
our Ambassador at Vichy, too late to participate in the
discussions of Sledgehammer, he was familiar with their gen-
eral setting. He wrote on page 110 of his valuable book of
memoirs "I Was There" his own judgment of that sorry and
provocative incident. Leahy wrote:
The Russians could not have been more disappointed
than our own Army people. * * *There was much grum-
bling about Britain and much criticism of Winston Church-
ill. The Prime Minister was convinced that England was
not ready to undertake such a major effort and I did not
think that we were either. He [Winston Churchill] wanted
to have much more assurance of success than General
Marshall could give him.
It became evident with the Sledgehammer quarrel that Mar-
20
shall intended to make his mark on the political and strategic
decisions of World War II. The next assertion of his will came
late in August 1942 when, without advance notice, the Ameri-
can Chiefs of Staff -- meaning Marshall -- served notice on the
British that they opposed the hitherto agreed upon plans to
invade North Africa by way of the Mediterranean as well as
the Atlantic coast of Morocco. "The Army," as Admiral
Leahy wrote, "was not well disposed toward the adventure."
The North Africa expedition had by now been christened Torch. The news
reached Churchill on the 25th of August.
Until that moment plans had been proceeding full speed ahead
for landings at Casablanca on the Atlantic, Oran, which is at
the western end of the Mediterranean coast of Algiers, and
at a point or points farther east toward Tunisia. Suddenly the
American chiefs notified the British that they now believed
the Mediterranean landings too hazardous to undertake.
Upon receipt of the advice from Washington that Torch
had been ditched by Marshall and his associates, Churchill
wrote a disparaging letter to Hopkins. This was on the 4th of
September and the text of the letter appears on page 540 of
The Hinge of Fate. He wrote Hopkins:
Frankly, I do not understand what is at the back of all
this. I thought there was agreement with Marshall and that
King bad been paid off with what he needed for his Pacific
war. But now it seems there is a bad comeback from the
professional circles in the American Army and I have a
deep and growing fear that the whole of the President's
enterprise may be wrecked bit by bit. With it will fall the
brightest hope of the Allies and the only hope this year.
The Prime Minister's letter was never mailed. Before it
could reach the letter box he had a cablegram from the
President announcing that he had overcome the opposition of
his staff and that the bell could again be rung for full speed
ahead on Torch. Had Roosevelt not overruled Marshall at this
critical time, undoubtedly Russia would enjoy the same domi-
nation over the Mediterranean area which she now enjoys over
the other unhappy areas behind the Iron Curtain. As early
as the White House conference known as Arcadia, the President
had given his full support to North Africa, saying at
that time, as quoted by the late General Arnold in his mem-
oirs Global Mission, "We must get into North Africa before the
Germans." In this connection it may be mentioned that
Stimson remarked in his book that 'The Mediterranean Basin
21
always fascinated Roosevelt." Sherwood likewise recalls the
President's strong preference for this operation, basing it upon
Roosevelt's "naval mindedness," and his knowledge that by
ridding North Africa of the Nazis we would free the lifeline to
the Middle East and the Far East by way of Suez, thus
obviating the long voyages around the Cape and providing for
ourselves a whole new theater from which the assault against
the Nazis could be carried out.
It is an interesting speculation as to the future of World
War II had we abandoned Torch or curtailed it by landing on
the Atlantic alone. There was strong British sentiment to land
in Tunisia as well as Tangiers at that time. A proposal from
British quarters suggested that several thousand soldiers could
be flown from Malta into Tunisia, which was only weakly
garrisoned by the French, to coincide with the landings in
Morocco and Algiers. This was vetoed. As it turned out, Hit-
ler was able to send more than 100,000 of his best troops into
Tunisia. These forces, With Rommel's army retreating before
Montgomery, made a formidable opposition, and it maybe
assumed that without the overpowering strength in the air
which the Allies were able to command, the war in North
Africa might, have dragged on indefinitely. Suppose we had
not landed in Algeria, suppose that the battle of North Africa
had continued for months on end and engaged ever larger
numbers of our forces -- in whose interest would that have
been? By winning the war in North Africa and by our
subsequent conquest of Sicily and Italy -- enterprises which
were unflaggingly opposed by Marshall -- we, instead of Russia,
were able to hold postwar command of at least the
Mediterranean away from the Red armies. The European
picture as of today would have been far different if the Red
armies had themselves received the surrender of Italy. As it
stands, we have Italy and a foothold on the opposite shore of
the Adriatic at Trieste, a foothold which is no doubt today a
reassurance to Tito.
No sooner had the North African campaign been launched
than Marshall again began to press his views in opposition to
what Churchill called the exploitation of the prospective victo-
ry. In spite of Churchill's most eloquent pleading, Marshall only very
reluctantly agreed to the attack on Sicily and Eisenhower, who had become
commander in chief in North Africa, was Marshall's firm supporter.
22
We now come to what was without question the most signi-
ficant decision of the war in Europe; the decision by Marshall
which was made against Roosevelt's half-hearted wishes and
Churchill's bulldog determination, to concentrate on France
and leave the whole of Eastern Europe to the Red armies. This strategical
struggle was pursued with great vigor, some-
times very violent on both sides. It only reached its
terminal point at Teheran, as we shall see, where the com-
bined weight of Stalin and Marshall defeated Churchill. I
cannot dwell too urgently on this great decision. Its military
effects were of no very great importance although the un-
necessary invasion of southern France, enjoined by Stalin and
Marshall gave Kesselring a welcome breathing spell in north-
ern Italy and protracted Mark Clark's campaign for the Po with an
attendant 1oss of American lives. It is the political
consequences of this controversy which stand forth in all
their stark implications for us today. I will attempt to sum-
marize the debate briefly.
The British, from the beginning of the strategical discussions
over North Africa, had been intent on carrying the war into
the Mediterranean. Their motives were mixed. Foremost per-
haps was their desire to relieve their forces in Egypt, which
had suffered several crushing blows. Secondarily, they wanted
the use of the Mediterranean for very obvious purposes of
communication. Thirdly, the British have had for many gener-
ations a paramount position in the eastern Mediterranean and
had wide interests both in those lands and in the Suez Canal
as a gateway to India and their great possessions and depend-
encies in the Orient and the Southern Seas. There was a further
and personal factor, which Marshall frequently charac-
terized as the Prime Minister's preoccupation with eccentric
operations, such as the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign in
World War I with which Churchill's name will be forever
associated. Overshadowing and of much more importance of course,
as we see it now and as we get glimpses in the writings
the principal actors of those times, was a steady desire on the
part of the British to reach Eastern Europe and the Balkans
before the Red armies.
23
I think there can be no question that Hanson Baldwin is
correct when he stigmatizes our military planning in this
connection as short-sighted. Churchill, with his intimate and
profound knowledge of the continuing drama of Europe
knew that a war is only a phase of history. Victory is one
thing; where you stand at the end of a war is another. He had
the ability to foresee what Europe would look like as a result
of certain policies.
Marshall triumphed over Churchill at the First Quebec
Conference in August 1943 with reference to this question.
That conference marked the end of Churchill's sway the
great decisions of the War. Thereafter the policy of the United
States in the European war was wholly and without deviation
the policy announced by Joseph Stalin. There was a break in
the relations between the two English-speaking powers, who
were carrying the brunt of the war, and the United States
thereafter was found always on the side of Stalin. To obtain
this result, Marshall bore down on British preoccupation with
the Mediterranean. I. have enumerated some of the basic
factors in the British position. Marshall ignored all of them
except the one addressed to British self-interest. He minimized
and derided the British position, likewise ridiculing the Prime
Minister's strategical judgment by frequent references to the
Dardanelles.
I believe that the rupture of interest between the United
States and Great Britain signified by this decision was one of
the most fateful changes in world relationships of our times. It
embittered our relationships at the first Quebec meeting, at
Cairo, and at Teheran.
At the moment le me generalize that the year 1943 was by
all odds the critical year of the war, casting its shadow over
the whole postwar period in which we now find ourselves
convulsed by anxiety and doubt. It was in February of 1943
that the Russians achieved victory over the Germans at Stalin-
grad. In fact, it can, I believe, be safely stated that World War
III started with the Russian victory at Stalingrad. Thereafter
they opened their diplomatic war against the West when they
gave every evidence of turning upon the Polish armies, the
Polish people, and the loyal and devoted Polish government in
exile in London.
The Kremlin's treatment of the Poles, beginning in the
spring of 1943, was the touchstone of this whole period, and
it was at the Quebec Conference that the whole dangerous
policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was
24
forecast and prefigured. At Quebec the decision was made to
invade southern France and keep the weakened American
Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army indecisively engaged
in Italy. It was at Quebec also that the most amazing and
indicative document that has so far emerged from the volumi-
nous records of World War II was brought to bear. This
document, a memorandum entitled "Russia's Position," affords
us clear insight into our subsequent surrenders at Teheran and
Yalta as well as at Potsdam. The document appears, and only
there in Sherwood's book about Hopkins. It is on page 748.
The memorandum is ascribed there to "a very-high-level
United States military strategic estimate." Sherwood reports
that Hopkins had it with him at Quebec. Can it be doubted
that this document emanated from General Marshall, whoever
drafted it? The question of its authorship is extremely impor-
tant. I hope that some day its authorship will be fixed for
all to see.
No document of World War II was more controlling on our fate.
Here it is in full:
Russia's postwar position in Europe will be a domninant
one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to
oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that
Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean
vis-a-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power
in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to
oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported.
The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since
Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given
every assistance, and every effort must be made to obtain
her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will
dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more
essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations
with Russia.
Finally, the most important factor the United States has
to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the
war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against
Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less
expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the
case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on
with an unfriendly or negative attitude on the part of
Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and
Operations might become abortive.
Sherwood understood the memorandum's significance. He wrote,
'This estimate was obviously of great importance as
indicating the policy which guided the making of decisions at
25
Teheran and, much later, at Yalta." What this document is, in
effect, is a rationalization of the whole policy of submission to
Russia during the remainder of world war II and, most
notably, in our relationships with China thereafter. What it
said was that as a result of the utter destruction of Germany
which we had erected into s policy at Casablanca with the
phrase "unconditional surrender," Russia would be the un-
questioned "top dog" in Europe after the war, and that it
bebooved the great, enlightened, and truly progressive English
speaking peoples therefore to cater to, to placate, and, in fact
to submit to the will of the Kremlin thereafter. It said unmis-
takably that the British endeavors in the Mediterranean, which
Marshall had succeeded in blocking, were aimed at balancing
Power in Europe vis-a-vis Russia.
That is bad enough But the document went further. It
insisted that we must carry this attitude of solicitude and
deference beyond Europe. We must bow to Russia in the Far
East as well. It is here that we find the fist explicit delineation
of the policy which produced the shameful betrayal of China at Yalta, the
blackmail paid by Roosevelt to get Russia into a war which she
had already announced her eagerness to wage.
The debate over Mediterranean policy had reached a focus
at the White House late in May of 1943 when Churchill again
crossed the Atlantic in pursuit of a common objective. He
found that Marshall was opposed to any action in the Medi-
terranean beyond taking Sardinia after the occupation of
Sicily, and that then all of our subsequent efforts were to be
devoted to what the late Sir John Dill, who was Chief of the
British Military Mission in Washington, once referred to in a
letter to Churchill as "Marshall's first love" -- the transchannel
invasion. Roosevelt was pulled and hauled on this issue as
much as on any in the war. His inclinations, based upon his
knowledge of geography and his adventurous strategic desires,
were toward expanding the war into eastern Europe. Ultimate-
ly, however, Roosevelt went along with Marshall.
So determined was Churchill at the White House in May to
have his views prevail that he induced Roosevelt to send
Marshall with him to North Africa for a further discussion
with military leaders in that theater. I gather from The Hinge
of Fate that it was at this point that Churchill realized that his
great antagonist in the war was Marshall, that he and Mar-
shall were virtually contending for the mastery of their views
over the impulsive will of the President. It was in connection
with this journey by Churchill and Marshall to North Africa
26
that the Prime Minister wrote in The Hinge of Fate, pages 812 and
813, a tribute to the general as a "statesman with a penetrating
and commanding view of the whole scene." It maybe noted that
Churchill did not ascribe to Marshall a correct and trustworthy
view of the whole scene and it may be wondered in
light of their great conflicts, whether the Prime Minister
was not perhaps indulging his rather frequent taste for irony.
In Tunis, Churchill brought to bear upon Marshall and Eisenhower,
who invariably sided with Marshall, the whole
battery of persuasion of himself and his military subordinates.
The views of the British were made more persuasive by the fact that
they had carried the major burden of the war in
North Africa. Marshall resisted, remaining, as Churchill com-
ments, "up 'til almost the last minute, silent or cryptic." The
upshot was that Marshall insisted upon deferring the decision
until Sicily had been made secure and "the situation in Russia
known." The quotation is from Churchill's report of the conference.
We recur to the Quebec Conference of August 14, as Admiral
Leahy reports it on page 175 of his book:
Marshall was very positive in his attitude against
a Mediterranean commitment.
Churchill did, however, temporarily prevail, and we invaded Italy;
but Marshall and Stalin won out in the end when Roosevelt sided
with them at Teheran, where there was thrown a
way the advantage of the Italian campaign. We are indebted
to Mr. Sherwood for the fullest account of the Stalin position
at Teheran. This account was obtained, of course,
from Hopkin's oral and written recollections. At one point, quoted
on page 780 of Sherwood's book, Stalin urged that the "entry
of Turkey into the war -- a development to which Churchill
was passionately committed, and which the Russians
had been previously urging -- might be helpful in opening the way in
the Balkans, but the Balkans were far from the heart Germany,
and the only direct way of striking at that heart was through France."
Here Roosevelt suggested that it might be useful
if the Americans and British marched east in con-
junction with Tito's Partisans into Rumania and joined with the Reds
at Odessa. Stalin inquired if that would affect the thirty-five
divisions earmarked for the transchannel invasion of France.
Churchill replied that it would not. Sherwood com-
ments, however, that "nothing could be further from the plans
27
of the United States Chief of Staff." It was then that Stalin
brought his powerful guns to bear to conclude the controver-
sy. I am quoting from Sherwood -- and he wrote:
Stalin expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to scatter
forces in various operations through the eastern
Mediterranean. He said he thought Overlord (the name
given to the crosschannal invasion) should be considered
the basis of all Operations in 1944 and that after the cap-
ture of Rome, the forces used there should be sent into southern
France to provide a diversionary operation in sup-
port of Overlord. He even felt that it might be better to
abandon the capture of Rome altogether, leaving 10 divisions
to hold the present line in Italy and using the rest of
the Allied forces for the invasion of southern France. He
said it had been the experience of the Red Army that it was
best to launch an offensive from two converging directions,
forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to
the other. Therefore, he favored simultaneous operations in
northern and southern France, rather than the scattering
of forces in the eastern Mediterranean.
We may be sure that Stalin'a didactic observations fell
upon Marshall's ears with the authority of revelation. It was
made abundantly evident at Teheran that Marshall had
earned the warm approval of Stalin. On page 783 of the
Sherwood record, the author notes that both Stalin and
Voroshilov obviously recognized Marshall as the supreme
advocate of Overlord and therefore their friend.
Sherwood notes that after Marshall had discussed the difficulties
of Overlord, Voroshilov turned to him and said admir-
ingly,. "If you think about it, you will do it."
On page 791, in discussing the moot question at that time
of who was to command Overlord, Sherwood repeats a report
that Stalin in discussions with Roosevelt, made evident his con-
viction that "no wiser or more reassuring choice than Mar-
shall could be made.
It is noteworthy that the brusque, cynical Stalin exhibited
fondness for no other American at Teheran with the single
exception of Hopkins, with whom he had a personal ac-
quaintance dating from Hopkins's visit to Moscow in August
of 1941 upon an errand which must have gratified the tyrant's
heart. It was then that Hopkins offered the bountiful support
of the United States to the Kremlin's resistance of the Nazi
invaders without stint, quid pro quo, or any reservations
whatsoever.
General "Hap" Arnold, who was not present at Teheran
28
because of illness, himself commented on the reports as he
received them. His comments will be found on page 465 of
Global Mission. Said Arnold:
Apparently Uncle Joe had talked straight from the shoul-
der about how to carryon the war against Germany, and
his ideas, it seems, were much more in accord with the
American ideas than with those of the British.
Admiral Leahy, who was there, adds his comment after
giving his own version of the Stalin speech I have quoted from
Sherwood. He wrote, and this is on page 204 of his book.
The Soviets and Americans seemed to be nearly in agree-
ment as to the fundamental strateglc principles that should
be followed.
Teheran took place in November and December of 1943.The projected
invasion of southern France was given the name Anvil.
Although Churchill and his advisers continued to
fight for the eastern operation, it was manifestly a losing
struggle. Churchill himself employed his stormy eloquence on
Mark Clark as that great American general was fighting his
way up Italian peninsula, assuring Clark that, given his
way, the Western Powers could "slit this soft under-belly of
the Axis." The Prime Minister was pursuing a lost cause. After
the capture of Rome, the Fifth Army which had become, as
Clark proudly asserts, "a tremendous fighting machine" with
"horizons unlimited," was disrupted. Over Clark's strong pro-
tests, he lost the Sixth Corps and seven crack French divi-
sions, all withdrawn for Anvil. Clark was compelled to
abandon his drive to the Po, giving Kesselring respite, a deci-
sion that puzzled the German high command, as we were to
discover after their surrender. Writes Clark on page 371 of
Calculated Risks: "It was s decision that was likely to puzzle
historians for a much longer time." In considering his impres-
sion of that period when he sat down to write his memoirs
after the war, Clark says, on page 368:
Stalin, it was evident throughout the Big Three meeting
and negotiations at Teheran, was not one of the strongest boosters
of the invasion of southern France. He knew ex-
actly what he wanted in a political as well as a military
way; and what he wanted was to keep us out of
the Balkans, which he had staked out for the Red Army.
If we switched our strength from Italy to France, it was
obvious to Stalin * * * that we would turn away from cen-
29
tral Europe. Anvil led into a dead-end street. It was easy
to see why Stalin favored Anvil at Teheran and why be kept
on pushing for it.
I come to a most significant passage which deals specifically
with what lay before Clark and was denied him by Marshall
in collaboration with Stalin. Says Clark:
After the fall of Rome, Kesselring's army could have
been destroyed if we had been able to shoot the works in a
final offensive. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia * * *
and beyond Yugoslavia were Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.
At this point may I remind you that wherever the Russian
armies came to rest, there they stayed and there they remain
to this day. The Red armies have not relinquished one inch of
the soil upon which they stood at the defeat of Germany.
General Clark continues:
There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in
the British mind, but so far as I ever found out, American
top-level planners were not interested. It was generally
understood that President Roosevelt toyed with the idea
for a while but was not encouraged by Harry Hopkins.
After the fall of Rome, we "ran for the wrong goal," both
from a political and a strategical standpoint.
Clark has, moreover, a superior vantage point from which
to judge the consequences because he served with the utmost
distinction as the American military governor of Vienna after
the war. It was there that he felt the iron determination of the
Soviet imperialism to prevail over eastern Europe. It was there
that be had ample opportunity to consider how differently
things might have been bad we proceeded east from the valley
of the Po instead of turning our forces into the trivial and
wholly unnecessary operations in southern France. General
Clark concludes on page 3 of his book, and I here summarize
him as the most highly qualified witness in this matter:
Yet, I believe our mission was fulfilled and, save for a
high-level blunder that turned us away from the Balkan
states and permitted them to fall under Red Army control,
the Mediterranean campaign might have been the most de-
cisive of all in postwar history.
At another place, expressing his frustration over the enfee-
blement of his campaign in Italy -- and this is on page 368 -
Clark writes:
30
A campaign that might have changed the whole history of the relationship between the Western World and Soviet Russia was permitted to fade away. * * * The weakening of the campaign in Italy * * * was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war.
President Truman's appointment of this great General
to the nonmilitary post of Ambassador to the Vati-
can, at this writing not yet confirmed, was Mark Clark,
a man pronouncedly in his military prime, a man of great achieve-
ment in Italy and of outstanding political and diplomatic
accomplishment in Austria? After his return home from Vi-
enna, General Clark was consistently relegated to secondary
commands.
So also is this true of General Wedemeyer, likewise in his
prime, likewise a soldier of great brilliance and great devotion
to his country.
Both Wedemeyer and Clark dared to oppose the judgment
of General Marshall in his history-making deci-
sions, Clark in Europe, Wedemeyer in Asia.
Where is Lucius Clay? Like MacArthur and Clark, a great
proconsul; young as generals go, brilliant and steadfast in
devotion not to party but to country. Clay insisted on resisting
the Russians at Berlin.
The lessons must be plain as a pikestaff to the military
leaders of our establishment. A prudent officer, looking for-
ward to his continued career and his pension, certainly has to
think twice before he expresses an objective and disinterested
opinion of strategy or of the conduct of our military opera-
tions.
MacArthur is not the only monument to the deter-
mination of Marshall to rule our politico-military policies now
as he ruled our policies in World War II. The evidence is
overwhelming that at Teheran we had no political policy. It so
appears in the recollections of Major John R. Deane. After observing,
an page 43 of his book The Strange Alliance, that "Stalin advocated the
American point of view in our differences with Britain" and again
that "Stalin's 'position' coincided with that of the American
Chief of Staff and every word he said strengthened the sup-
port they might expect from President Roosevelt in the ulti-
mate decision," Deane continues:
Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the
conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of
Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection on our President
but his apparent indecision was probably a direct result of
31
our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was think-
ing of winning the war; the others were thinking of their
relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the
Anglo-American forces in Western and southern Europe;
Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved
and British interests best served if the Anglo-Americans, as
well as the Russians, participated in the occupation of the
Balkans. From the political point of view, hindsight on our
part points to foresight on Churchill's part.
The political immaturity of our generals, mentioned by
Hansen Baldwin, was never so glaringly manifested as at
Teheran -- if, indeed, it was political immaturity and not the
consequences of some hidden, and so far undisclosed, in-
fluence binding us to Stalin's world policy.
Could it be that, like children, our military advisers at
Teheran dwelt only on the pleasures and tasks of the day with
no thought for the morrow? Could they not envisage what
was so clear to many other minds, that after the conclusion of
hostilities the Soviet Union, conscious of its vast and violent
world mission, might be ranged against us in every quarter of
the globe? Or did Marshall and his supernumeraries on the
Joint Chiefs at Teheran think of England instead of Russia as
the future enemy?
Before quitting this question of the Marshall-Churchill
conflict over the most important phases of the recent war, I
shall cite another example of the ruthlessness with which
Marshall prosecuted the rift. It should be noted that Church-
ill, who is an indomitable adversary in the House of Commons
and elsewhere, fought on against Anvil long after
his was a lost cause.
At Malta, where the Yalta conferees on the Anglo-
American side met before proceeding to that Black Sea
conference, the British chiefs still persisted in the hope of
accomplishing some Mediterranean operations while pre-
paring for the attack across the Channel. In Sherwood's book,
page 848, is a revealing passage concerning those discussions
of the combined chiefs:
The arguments reached such a point that Marsball, ordi-
narily one of the most restrained and soft-spoken of men,
announced that if the British plan were approved by the
Prime Minister and the President, he would recommend to
Eisenhower that he bad no choice but to be relieved of his
command.
Again, as in the case of the ultimatum over the "second
32
front now," Marshall was threatening summary action unless
his will prevailed. Why was it so important to Marshall that
the British, as a full partner in the Anglo-American war effort,
should be prevented from creating that balance of military power in the
Mediterranean spoken of in the memorandum circulated by Hopkins
at the first Quebec conference?
Before we proceed to other matters of political strategy, let
us consider instances in the management of American military
affairs in World War II where Marshall's actions operated
directly against the interests of the United States.
General Deane is an uncommonly friendly witness for George
Marshall. He was Marshall's protege, having served as secretary
of the combined chiefs in Washington until Mar-
shall sent him in the fall of 1943 to Moscow as chief of our
military mission in Russia. It should be noted that we had
withdrawn our military and naval attaches from Moscow
because, in fulfilling the time-honored and expected duties of
military attaches, they had aroused the resentment of the
Kremlin. Those duties include discovering and reporting to the
home government all information that can be obtained legiti-
mately regarding the armed forces of the country to which the
are accredited. The information thus sought has to do
with weapons, tactical programs and methods, and the size,
training and disposition of that country's military forces.
Before General Deane departed for his mission to Moscow,
he had a long interview with General Marshall, in which the
Chief of Staff cautioned Deane to seek no information about
these matters for fear that he might "irritate" the Russians. We
were then devoting a substantial part of our military pro-
duction to Russia's war effort, and doing so in entirely good
faith. It was not long after General Deane reached Moscow
that he began to be impressed with the extraordinary contrast
between the Russian attitude and our own. This he describes
on page 49 of his book:
We had thousands of Soviet representatives in the United
States who were allowed to visit our manufacturing plants,
attend our schools, and witness tests of aircraft and other
equipment. In Italy, and later in France and Germany, Rus-
sian representatives were welcome at our field headquarters
and allowed to see anything they desired of our military
operations. Our policy was to make any of our new inven-
tions in electronics and other fields available to Russia
* * * each month I would receive a revised list of secret
American equipment about which Russia could be informed
33
in the hope that if it could be made available, it might be
used on the Russian front. We never lost an opportunity to
give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which
we thought might help our combined war effort.
The head of the American military mission in Moscow en-
countered the Iron Curtain long before Churchill coined the
phrase. Toward the end of the war, when our always excessive
solicitude seemed to him no longer warranted, he advised a
more resolute attitude toward the Russians. Each time he
suggested that we demand a fu1f1llment of an agreement - and
they broke virtually every agreement we made with them - he
was called off in Washington. By whom? Deane's reports went
directly to General Marshall.
Why have we not had, and do not have at this moment, an
American; or at least an allied, corridor to Berlin? Why are we
at the mercy of the Russians in our access to the joint capital
of the occupying powers? Why was it possible for the Rus -
sians to produce the blockage of Berlin with a simple set of
instructions with which General Clay found it impossible, as a
man of honor and a great American soldier, to comply?
It has been the fashion to place the blame for this lack of
foresight upon the late John G. Winant. As our Ambassador
to London he sat on the European Advisory Commission,
which worked out under the direction of the respective gov-
ernments the zoning of Germany for occupation purposes.
Winant cannot answer our questions now. General Clay, in
his report on his great career as the American governor in
Germany, Decision In Germany, accepts the version that
shoulders the blame onto Winant. Subsequently, on page
26, he himself takes the final blame. He was in Berlin in late
June of 1945 arranging with Marshall Zhukov for the entry of
American forces into their occupation position in Berlin.
The Russians were, as usual, hard to deal with. Clay was
eager to get his occupation going and to have American
forces on guard in Berlin. Instead of pressing the matter of a
corridor under American rule, guarded by American troops,
with supply and communication beyond the reach of Russian
interference, he accepted an oral understanding with Zhukov
that nothing would ever occur to impede American access to
Berlin. Our zonal border, it will be recalled, had been set a
distance of 100 miles from Berlin.
The legend which saddled the late Winant with the respon-
sibility for this tragic blunder in postwar arrangements has
been vigorously challenged by Hanson Baldwin, who fixes the
34
responsibility not on Winant but squarely on the War Depart-
ment. "War Department" at that time meant George Catlett
Marshall. From the fall of 1939 until the fall of 1946, Mar-
shall was, in effect, the War Department. I cannot find in
Mr. Stimson's memoirs any occasion on which he opposed the will
of General Marshall.
On page 47 of Baldwin's book, he expresses his conviction
that "the blame for Berlin cannot be laid exclusively, or even
to a major degree - upon the shoulders of Winant." Two
pages later, in reviewing the background of this deplorable
situation, Baldwin notes that the State Department at the end
of 1943 proposed that the zones of postwar occupation "be so
drawn as to bring each into contact with Berlin." I hasten
to add that Cordell Hull -- not Marshall or Dean Acheson --
was then Secretary of State.
I go on with Baldwin:
For some reason that defies logical understanding now,
the War Department rejected this suggestion, which would
have solved nearly all our postwar Berlin difficulties, so that
it was never even broached in the EAC.
In February 1944, the British informally suggested that a
corridor o Berlin be established and defined, but the War
Department again objected, stating that this was not a
subject for the EAC, but that the entire question of access
to Berlin was a military matter which should be settled at
the proper time by military representatives.
And this eventually was the solution, but the military
representatives made a botch of it. In May 1945 our allies
stood deep on German soil. The zonal occupation agree-
ments for Germany * * * placed Berlin in the Russian zone
* * *. In May 1945 ECA's work was done and SCAEF was
briefed as to its accomplishments.
The military were told the history of the problem. They
were told that the War Department had blacked any consider-
ation of it by EAC and were advised that the EAC staff
believed we should have an indisputably American corridor
under our own military supervision and guard. As we have
seen, neither Marshall nor Eisenhower made provision for a
corridor; General Clay concluded his improvised agreement
with Zhukov, and the fat was in the fire.
Why did the War Department, meaning Marshall, leave us
at the mercy of the Russians in Berlin? Why did not our forces
march first into Berlin? Why was General Patton not allowed
to take Prague? We have only glimpses of the inner reality
35
behind these questions. We gather from General Bradley's
memoirs that Eisenhower's decision not to reach Berlin first
was conditioned to some extent by the vagrant quarrel that
had arisen between Bradley and General Montgomery. In his
version of the matter, appearing on page 69 of Life magazine
for April 30, 1951, Bradley relates a discussion with Eisen-
hower wherein it was decided not to allow Montgomery the
forces with which to push on to Berlin. Eisenhower was
principally concerned at the moment lest the armies of Russia
and the English-speaking powers should meet in a head-on
collision somewhere in Germany. I quote Bradley on how
Eisenhower solved the problem:
Five days before Hodges and Simpson closed their trap
around the Ruhr, Eisenhower radioed Stalin through the
United States Military Mission in Moscow of his plan to
push east with a powerful force in the center to the line of
the Elbe.
The Elbe line was where Eisenhower proposed to Stalin
that he would bring the American armies to rest. Eisenhower
fixed this highly important point, be it noted, with Stalin. It is
clear from Bradley's recollections that Eisenhower acted on
this highly political question without consulting with Churchill.
Whether he consulted Roosevelt and Marshall is not men-
tioned by Bradley. Certainly he must have consulted Marshall.
I continue to quote Bradley:
Although Churchill protested Eisenhower's radio to Mos-
cow as an unwarranted intrusion by the military into a
political problem; he reserved his angriest vituperation for
the plan Eisenhower proposed. The Prime Minister, accord-
ing to Eisenhower, was greatly disappointed and disturbed
that SCAEF had not reinforced Montgomery with Ameri-
can troops and pointed him toward Berlin in a desperate
[sic] effort to capture that city before the Russians took it.
We gain another bit of insight into this situation -- which
provides a somewhat more startling example of command
discretion than any displayed by Macarthur in Japan -- from
Edward Ansel Mowrer in his book The Nightmare of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, in which he relates having been personally
told by the White House that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised
Truman to let the Russians take Berlin." The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
of course, meant Marshall.
36
We have been reviewing General Marshall's record as it applies to the war
in Europe with an eye to his competence and the extent to which he
backed up Stalin in political decisions. The Democrats
in Denver proclaimed him "a master of global strategy." The term,
of course, implies much more than purely military planning.
As we have seen, when you reach the upper levels of command
inhabited during the recent war by Marshall, Churchill, and Roosevelt,
the military decisions blend everywhere with the political. They
cannot be disassociated. A war is not conducted merely as a means of
killing the enemy, although during the late war Mr. Roosevelt
expressed so much joy over Russia's accomplishments in that
line that it might be questioned if he always understood the
the nature of war. We have seen recently in Korea where, beg-
gered of any respectable and intelligent war purpose, our
forces were led to believe from Marshall's testimony that the
only objective of war was to kill the enemy. I put aside
the ethical considerations raised by such an attitude and point
out that the enemy's extermination is not enough. Of course, it
is necessary to have the enemy's submission. But, also, great
powers must have some understanding of what that submis-
sion portends and what they intend to do with the world over
which they will exercise sway once the enemy is defeated.
We have observed what calamities might have befallen the
allied cause had Roosevelt accepted Marshall's persistent de-
mand for a "second front now." We have seen the equivocal
and dangerous nature of his counsel with reference to the
North African invasion. We have observed how closely he
fitted his views into those of Stalin over every major issue of
the war. We have seen further how, in his instructions to
General Deane, his refusal to exercise foresight over the corri-
dor to Berlin, and his wish that the Russians might first enter
that great and shattered city, General Marshall's decisions
paralleled the interests of the Kremlin.
The Democrats at Denver may have been correct in their
appraisal of General Marshall's attainments as a strategist.
The question that arises, after examining the facts we have
enumerated and those we shall enumerate, is, in whose in-
terest did he exercise his genius? If he was wholeheartedly
serving the cause of the United States, these decisions were
great blunders. If they followed a secret pattern to which we
do not as yet have the key, they may very well have been
successful in the highest degree.
37
We turn now to the Pacific side of the recent global war and
an examination of General Marshall's behavior in that vast
theater.
First, we must consider what went on at Yalta. If, as
Hanson Baldwin observes, we lost the peace because of great
political mistakes in World War II, then it is clear that those
mistakes culminated in the controlling decisions made at the
conferences of Teheran and Yalta. It is my judgment that we
lost the peace in Europe at Teheran. It is even clearer that we
lost the peace in Asia at Yalta. At Teheran, Marshall's will
prevailed in concert with that of Stalin regarding the Mediter-
ranean and Eastern Europe. At Yalta, Marshall's will pre-
vailed, with that of Stalin, regarding Russia's entry into the
far eastern war as a full-fledged partner entitled to the spoils of
such participation.
Yalta is a former resort of the Romanoff Czars on the
shores of the Black Sea. Yalta is where Roosevelt, already
suffering from the enfeeblement that brought his death four
months later, went to meet again with the bloody autocrat of
all the Russians and the Churchill with whom he had signally
differed at Teheran.
The President, bearing the marks of his approaching disso-
lution, traveled the thousands of weary miles by plane, by
ship, and, at the end, by motorcar, to treat with the tyrant,
to seek accord with him, and to make the bargains over Po-
land and China that today plague and shame us all. The
principal, the most utterly damaging, of these bargains con-
tained the bribe he paid to Stalin for his eleventh-hour
participation in the war against Japan.
Manchuria is the richest part of Chins. In terms of area
and natural resources it may be described as the Texas of
China. But Manchuria has not been China's to enjoy for
many years. It must be recalled, and this is a key to much of
China's fearful history during the last generation that the age-
old empire of China came to its end in the years before World
War I. The causes of that event need not take up too much of
38
our time. The Imperial court, presided over by the aged
dowager empress was beset by western ideas, western-trained
Chinese reformers, notably Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by the incompe-
tence of the empress' advisers and by the conflicting and
greedy claims of the Great Powers. And so it fell, and for a
generation China has known neither peace nor freedom from
foreign invasion.
Manchuria itself has been the scene and occasion of wars
for more than half a century. Japan and Russia alike have
fought for its mastery since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.
When, after that war, the Japanese were prevented by the
European powers from enjoying the fruits of victory in Man-
churia, Russia lunged down from the Maritime Provinces of
Siberia to fill that vacuum.
By the year 1904, Japan felt strong enough to challenge
Russia over Manchuria. That was what the Russo-Japanese
War was about, a war in which Theodore Roosevelt backed
Japan by deed and sentiment, out of a fear of the growing
might of Russia in eastern Asia. Theodore Roosevelt was
solely pursuing American interest, and when he saw that
Japan, if it won too conclusive a victory, might succeed to
Russia's mantle and advance farther into China, Roosevelt
intervened. He brought the Japanese and Russians together at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to negotiate a peace which
checked Japanese ambitions even as it also ended Russian
sway in Manchuria.
The intervening years saw a steady encroachment by Japan
over Manchuria, an encroachment viewed with alarm by the
single-minded Americans who then conducted our foreign
policies, until the climax was reached in 1937 when Japan
launched full-scale war against China for undisputed control
of Manchuria and northern China. Korea, which is a geo-
graphical dependency of Manchuria, had, of course, been
sacrificed to Japan's imperial ambitions along the route and
had long since been integrated into the empire of Nippon.
The historic route of the invaders of China has been from
the north. During many centuries, China has mounted guard
on its northern frontiers against the peoples of Manchuria,
Mongolia, and Siberia, who have, for as many centuries, been
regarded as barbarians by the civilized Chinese. Manchuria
has been the key to the security of China since the Manchu
conquest nearly four centuries ago. This fact we should re-
member and consider, as we remember Yalta.
39
It was a rich, highly developed Manchuria that was at
stake at Yalta. It was Manchuria which Franklin D. Roosevelt
thrust upon the Russians; it was, moreover, conferred upon
the new barbarians with full understanding that the United
States was thereby satisfying an old imperialistic design of the
Kremlin. The very language of the secret protocol which
sealed the bargain at Yalta recognized this fact. What Roose-
velt ceded to Stalin at Yalta, without the knowledge or
consent of the Chinese, whose sovereignty there we always
bad upheld, was, and I quote from the work of Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians, page 93, in restora-
tian of "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacher-
ous attack of Japan in 1904." The testimony before the
Russell Committee shows that Cbiang-Kal-shek was not invit-
ed to the Yalta Conference and that the terms of the agree-
ment selling out Chinese interests were kept secret from him.
At the Cairo Conference, however, it was solemnly agreed
with him that China's rights in Manchuria would be fully
respected and protected. When Wedemeyer appeared before
the Russell Committee, he testified that when Ambassador
Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek of the Yalta agreement
which sealed the doom of the Republic of China, Chiang
was so shocked that he asked Hurley to repeat it before
could believe it.
The project was not disguised. It was a nakedly imperialistic
aggression over the prostrate body of China. What Roosevelt
sealed and delivered in the protocol agreed upon by him and
Stalin in a secret parley consuming only eleven minutes, and
thereafter kept locked away in a White House safe for many
months, were the historic levers of power over China - the
ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern and
South Manchurian railways. It was through those ports and
along those railways, with their armed guards and command
of all the communications, including the telegraph lines, that
first Russia, then Japan, and now again Russia, with her
satellite, exercised mastery over Manchuria.
According to the terms of the bribe, drawn up in Moscow
by that elusive statesman of the half world in which our
relations with Russia dwell, Averell Harriman, Dairen was to
be "internationalized," the preeminent interests of the Soviet
Union being safeguarded, and "the lease of Port Arthur as a
naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored." I have quoted from the
protocol as published by Stettinius. I again quote:
40
The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Man-
churian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall
be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-
Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent
interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that
China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.
There were other provisions. Russia's long-standing protec-
torate over Outer Mongolia was ratified, the southern end of
Sakhalin, of which Russia was deprived by the treaty of Portsmouth,
was restored to her, and, as if to boot, the Kuriles were handed her.
The Kuriles had been Japanese, never Russian.
What shall we say of Roosevelt's cynical submission to
Russian imperialism in that deal? This was the Roosevelt,
mark you, who is represented to us in Sumner Welles's book
Seven Decisions That Shaped History, as the high-principled
opponent of imperialism in Hong Kong and India. This is the
the Roosevelt who steadfastly through the war sought to persuade
Churchill to get out of India and surrender the British lease-
hold of Hong Kong. This was the Roosevelt who proposed to
Stalin at Yalta -- and I hand this in Sherwood on page 866 --
that Hong Kong be handed to the Chinese or international-
ized and that colony turned over to a United Nations trustee-
ship. This was the Roosevelt who suggested that French
Indochina be placed under a trusteeship. He broached this
idea to Sumner Welles.
What does this whole sordid transaction teach us about the
good faith of the advisers of Roosevelt and the assorted
liberals, Communists, Communist sympathizers, and agents of
the Kremlin - the Achesons, the Lattimores, the Philip Jes-
sups, and the Institute of Pacific Relations -- who have for so
long been insincerely befuddling the people with talk of impe-
erialism and people's rights in Asia?
Why, merely this, that in their minds the imperialism of the
West, that decaying instrument of European expansion, is
wicked and must be opposed. The imperialism of Russia is not
only commendable but must be advanced by every means of
diplomacy and war at whatever cost to the United States.
That is the liberal-leftist doctrine on imperialism. Have we
heard one liberal voice raised in the Senate or elsewhere in
condemnation of Roosevelt's surrender to Russian imperialism
at Yalta? This is the test, and by it we may measure the
monstrous hypocrisy of the liberal elements in Congress and in
41
the country which have assisted in and applauded the surren-
der of all China to Russia without the firing of a single
Russian shot.
The apologists for Mr. Roosevelt have attempted to palliate
his offense. Robert Sherwood suggests that Roosevelt was
enfeebled. I quote him: "Had it not been that the Yalta
Conference was almost at an end and he was tired and
anxious to avoid further argument," Roosevelt, in his opinion,
might have refused to sign the protocol This is on page 867
of Roosevelt and Hopkins. Yet on the preceding page, he
nullifies the argument of fatigue by conceding:
It is quite clear that Roosevelt had been prepared even
before the Teheran Conference in 1943 to agree to the
legitimacy of most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far
East, for they involved the restoration of possessions and
privileges taken by the Japanese from the Rassiansin the
war of 1904.
And Sherwood elsewhere reports Roosevelt offering Stalin
the 'warm-water port" of Dairen as early as Teheran. Mr.
Sherwood is known as a fervent and practicing "liberal." He
sees nothing wrong in restoring the imperialistic "possession
and privileges" which had been wrested from a dying Chinese
empire by the forces of Czarism. The insincerity, the specious-
ness, the nonlogical workings of the liberal mind when it
comes to Russian ambitions are clearly manifested by Mr.
Sberwood. Mr. Welles presents a better case. He, too, is a
"liberal," but with a higher sense of responsibility to history. I
need not introduce Mr. Welles to the reader. He served in the
Department of State until the fall of 1943, when his long-
standing feud with Cordell Hull brought about the termina-
tion of his public service. Mr. Welles was Under Secretary
of State when dismissed. His book Seven Decisions That
Shaped History is an apologia for his late chief, Roosevelt,
and a justification for certain events in his own career.
Mr. Welles insists that Roosevelt's betrayal of China and
the United States at Yalta is excusable. On what ground? The
ground of military necessity. When Roosevelt acted, according
to Welles, he did so because he believed that we must entice
Stalin into committing what we see as a plain act of self-
interest, namely, getting into the war against Japan before it
was too late. The President made that judgment because he
bad been advised by his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of
42
Staff, that we had a long, hard row to hoe with the Japanese
and that without Russia's help we might not achieve victory.
That is the Welles doctrine. It is likewise the Marshall-Acheson-State
Department line. Where Welles differs is that he exposes that
the military advice upon which Roosevelt acted
was false and misleading. And where does the
pursuit of this rationalization lead us?
As we might suppose -- to Marshall.
It was Marshall who stood at Roosevelt's elbow at Yalta,
urging the grim necessity of bribing Stalin to get into the war.
It was Marshall who submitted intelligence reports to support
this argument, suppressing more truthful estimates, according
to Hanson Baldwin on page 81, and keeping from the stricken
Roosevelt knowledge that the Japanese were even then feeling
for peace in acknowledgment of defeat.
Was this a sincere endeavor by the master of global strategy
to advance American interest? Did we sorely need Russian assistance?
Or was it another in the baffling pattern of General
Marshall's interventions in the course of the great war which
conduced to the well-being of the Kremlin?
The desire to have Russia's help in the Far East arose with
Marshall and was embodied, as we know, in the fateful appeasement
memorandum of the first Quebec conference in August of 1943;
the document which charted our course at Teheran and Yalta and
thereafter. The desire to entice Russiain to the Japanese war was
officially embodied in a combined Chiefs of Staff doctrine
which I have previously discussed and which was
presented at second Quebec, in September of
1944. Back in the fall of 1943 the President sent Averell Harriman
to Moscow as his Ambassador and Marshall sent General Deane, their
"prime objective," as Deane describes it on page 23 of his book,
being "to induce Soviet participation in the war with Japan."
Were inducements necessary? Was it in the Kremlin's inter-
est to become a full-fledged combatant in the war in the Far
East, to take part in the defeat of Japan and have a seat at the peace
table where the spoils of war would be divided? Was it to the
Kremlin's interest to march its armies into Manchuria, from which
they had been barred since 1905 by the Kwantung army, and to be
in possession there when the war ended?
If some Americans did not grasp the strategic importance
of Manchuria, there is certainly abundant evidence
that the Kremlin, faithful to Lenin's dictum that "he who
43
controls China controls the world," never lost sight of it. To
ask these questions is to answer them, even if we lacked the
indications of Stalin's determination to be in at the Far
Eastern kill, which we have. Any intelligent American, after
giving the matter sufficient thought, would know that the aim
of Roosevelt and Marshall at Yalta should have been not how
to get the Russians in, but how to keep them out.
I have evidence of four occasions before Yalta on which
Stalin indicated to American officials his desires in this respect.
The first such suggestion was made to Averell Harriman
when, in August of 1942, he went to Moscow with Churchill
to deliver the word that the operations in North Africa had
been substituted for the second front now so exigently de-
manded by Stalin and Marshall. The occasion is reported by
General Deane on page 226 of his book:
Stalin told Harriman then that Japan was the historical
enemy of Russia and that her eventual defeat was essential
to Russian interests. He implied that while the Soviet
Union's military position at that time would not permit her
participation, eventually she would come in.
Roosevelt knew of this: so, presumably, did Marshall. It
should be noted that Stalin ascribed Russian interests as his
motive for fighting Japan.
The Red Czar next informed General Patrick J. Hurley of
his intentions. And in April of 1943 Hurley so reported to
Admiral Leahy. The reference is on page 147 of Leahy's
book, and I quote him:
Hurley saw Stalin * * * and the Marshall told him that
after Germany was defeated, he would assist America in
the war against Japan * * * The [our] army, in its plans
for the defeat of Japan, was anxious to have the help of
Russia. It was my opinion that we could defeat Japan with-
out Russian assistance.
The stouthearted old sea dog Leahy held to that opinion
throughout, being overborne always by Marshall. The history
of the war in the Far East and our postwar loss of China,
with the resultant war in Korea, would have been far different
had Leahy been, as his rank prescribed, the principal military
adviser to Roosevelt. That was not to be. The iron will of
Marshall prevailed over Leahy, as it did over Roosevelt and,
after the invasion of Italy, over Churchill.
44
I digress to report the substance of Leahy's opposition to
asking the Russians in, became it bears so pertinently on the
issue and because Leahy's qualifications were so high, his
reasoning so soundly American. In the record of World War
II, were Leahy occupies an honorable place, no question can
arise at any time as to where his loyalties lie.
In the strategical discussions about how to end the war
with Japan, Marshall urged that a land invasion was necces-
sary; an invasion beginning in the southern islands of the
Japanese homelands and proceeding north; an invasion requir-
ing upward of 2,000,000 riflemen and entailing, according to
Marshall's estimates, casualties of half a million.
Leahy reports a conference at the White House on the 10th
of July 1944. This is on page 245 of his book. Wrote Leahy:
It was my opinion, and I urged it strongly on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, that no major land invasion of the Japanese
Mainland was necessary to win the war.
Far more compelling even than Leahy's own judgment was
the agreement he reported, page 251, between General Mac-
Arthur and Admiral Nimitz at Honolulu on that point. Leahy
accompanied Roosevelt, it will be recalled, on that excursion,
which coincided with the Democratic National Convention of
1944. He attended the conversations at which the President
and the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific projected
victory over Japan. These -- Nimitz and MacArthur -- were the
true experts on the Pacific. Let us have their judgment and
Leahy's conclusions thereon:
The agreement on fundamental strategy to be employed
in defeating Japan and the President's familiarity with the
situation acquired at this conference were to be of great
value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which
the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Depart-
ment were advocating, regardless of the loss of life that
would result from an attack on Japan's ground forces in
their own country. MacArthur and Nimitz were now in
agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground
and air power then available in the western Pacific
and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of sur-
render by the use of sea and air power without an invasion
of the Japanese homeland.
There we have the strategy of MacArthur, Nimitz, and
45
Leahy for winning the war in the Pacific -- but not Marshall's.
Who was right?
Yet, despite this expert advice, Marshall persisted. At the
staff discussions before second Quebec, two months later,
Leahy had this to report on page 259:
By the beginning of September, Japan was almost de-
feated through a practically complete sea and air blockade.
However, a proposal was made by the Army to force a
surrender of Japan by an amphibious invasion of the main
islands through the island of Kyushu. * * * The Army did
not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with
some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan.
The Army not only was planning a huge land invasion of
Japan, but was convinced that we needed Russian assistance
as well to bring the war against Japan to a successful con-
clusion.
So much for the strategy of the matter.
I return to the indications of Russia's intentions in
the Far East. Cordell Hull was the unexpected and extremely gratified
recipient of the third such proffer of help in the Far East. The
venerable Secretary of State, an upright and proud man,
although he did not wholly understand the currents of high
policy that swirled about him, went to Moscow in October of
1943 to attend a conference of the Allied foreign ministers. It
was a momentous occasion for Mr. Hull, the crowning accom-
plishment of a lifetime devoted to public service. At that time
Mr. Hull suffered from the current credulity about Russia's
good faith in the highest American circles. He was insisting, to
the annoyance of subtler minds, that Russia was one nation,
Britain another, equal in merit as in menace, and that we must
treat them with equal and exact consideration. A fair-spoken
man himself, Mr. Hull assumed that he was dealing with men
of like scruple.
On the final night of his stay in Moscow, Mr. Hull attended
the usual state banquet with which the master of the Kremlin
regales his visitors. The banquet took place in the Hall of
Catherine the Great at the Kremlin. They dined upon gold
plate and drank innumerable toasts from heavy crystal.
Mr. Hull felt himself honored at being on the right of the
prime author of world misfortune. After having suitably flat-
tered Stalin, Hull was "astonished and delighted" when the
46
Marshall turned to him and said, as recorded on page 1309 of
Mr. Hull's Memoirs:
clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies had suc-
ceded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then
join in defeating Japan. Stalin had brought up this subject
on his own. * * * He finished by saying that I could
inform President Roosevelt of this in the strictest confidence.
I thanked him heartily.
The Secretary of State lost no time in cabling the promise
to Roosevelt using both the Army and Navy ciphers in the
hope of keeping the news from the British. It was Mr. Hull's
belief, a belief too often verified, that the Foreign Office in
London leaked secrets.
In his reflections over Yalta--Hull had by then resigned -
he seemed to think it passing strange that Roosevelt had had
to acquire Stalin's assistance by means of "numerous territorial
concessions." He added, "When Stalin made his promise to
me it had no strings attached to it."
The fourth assurance from Stalin regarding the Far East
came at Teheran, where he observed that, once peace came in
Europe, "by our common front we shall win" in that quarter.
But by that time, recognizing that Harriman and Deane had
come to Moscow to ply him for his assistance, Stalin was,
quite naturally, thinking of his price. The price was not cheap.
In October of 1944, during Churchill's second visit to Moscow,
Harriman got Stalin on the subject of the war against
Japan. Deane noted, page 247 of his book that Stalin agreed
That the Soviet Union would take the offensive after Germany's
defeat, provided the United States would insist on building
up the necessary reserve supplies for (60 divisions in Siberia)
and provided the political aspects of Russia's participation
had been clarified. His latter proviso referred to the
recognition by China of Russia’s claims against Japan in the
Far East.
At this sitting Stalin agreed that the United States Navy
might have Petropavlovsk on the Pacific as a naval base and
our air forces the sites for heavy bomber bases in the Maritime
but denied us use of the Trans-Siberian railroad to Haul in supplies.
This was the gun pointed at Roosevelt's head. If we
47
wanted Russia in, we had to supply her armies and force
Chiang-Kia-shek to accept the loss of Manchuria, which had
been solemnly promised him by Roosevelt and Churchill at
Cairo. Marshall insisted, again beyond the call of duty, that we
needed Russia. Roosevelt believed him. The cost of supplies
was fairly heavy, the Russians stipulating what amounted to
860,410 tons of dry cargo, 206,000 tons of liquid cargo. All
this in addition to the supplies for the war in Europe called
for under the fourth protocol. The Russians got 80 per cent
of their Far Eastern requirements. One item was 25,000 tons
of canned meat. That would provide at least 50,000,000
courses, at a pound each, for the Red soldiers.
I return to Yalta, where Stalin got his price in full, the
conference which is described by Hanson Baldwin as "the
saddest chapter in the long history of political futility which
the war recorded."
What was the war situation in the Pacific in January of
1945? Leyte was ours, the Japanese fleet was defeated, Manila
fell during the Yalta Conference. Okinawa lay ahead, but the
Air Force was daily raining destruction and fire on Japanese
cities. General William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services
was reporting from China that the Kwantung army had
been dissipated and depleted. In any case, said the OSS, what
was left could not be moved to the Japanese home islands
because of the lack of shipping. Nor could the Japanese
troops in China be moved. Everywhere the story was the
same. The Japanese merchant marine was beneath the sea.
The blockade was strangling Japan. Admiral Leahy wrote on
page 293 of his book concerning his own views of the
situation at this time:
I was of the firm opinion that out war against Japan
had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter
of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's
help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific, The Army did not
agree with me and Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with
Stalin.
Hanson Baldwin writing after the event, endorsed Leahy's
conclusions, saying, on page 79 of his book:
At the time of Yalta, Japan was already beaten - not by
the atomic bomb which had not yet been perfected, not by
48
conventional bombing then just starting, but by attrition
and blockade.
Yet at Yalta, Marshall redoubled his endeavors for
Russia's entrance with all the indomitable persistence he had
applied to the "second front now" and to blocking Mark
Clark and the British over eastern European strategy. The
late Edward Stettinius, who, as Secretary of State, played a
hand at Yalta, recalled on page 90 of Roosevelt and the
Russians:
I knew at Yalta * * * of the immense pressure put on
the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into
the far-eastern war.
Before Stettinius left Washington he saw a memorandum
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State Department which said:
"We desire Russia's entry at the earliest possible date."
In support of his urgent demand, Marshall used what
Baldwin calls on page 80 of his book "a pessimistic intelli-
gence estimate," which placed the strength of the Kwantung
Army in Manchuria at 700,000, a total of 2,000,000 Japanese
forces on the Asiatic mainland--"all first rate troops and well
trained according to Marshall. Far worse than this, Baldwin
exposes the fact that more realistic intelligence estimates, cor=
responding to the facts as brought out after the war and held
at that time by Leahy and others, "never reached the top
echelon at Yalta. Even the Washington Post, that pillar of
leftism and scuttle in Asia, felt moved on September 9, 1948,
to declare that the Chiefs of Staff had "made a blunder to
advise Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta that Japan would last
18 months after VE-day."
Nor is this the end of this dismal story.
Rear Admiral E. M. Zacharias, in his book Behind Closed
Doors, declares that a Japanese peace feeler had
been received and transmitted to Washington by General MacArthur before
Roosevelt had departed for Yalta. So at the time we sold out China to
Russia to induce Russia to come into the Japanese
war, we already had Japan suing for peace, according to
Admiral Zacharias. The peace overtures were to come thick
and fast from Japanese sources after Yalta, and by the time of
Potsdam were so authentic that the Declaration of Pots-
dam was put forward to answer them.
Yet, in late April of 1945 Marshall was still intent upon
49
wooing the Russians into the Far Eastern war. As Stettinius
reports it on page 97:
At a top-level policy meeting in the White House just
before the San Francisco conference opened on April 25,
President Truman, the military leaders and I discussed the
failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement
on the Balkans. At this meeting the United States military
representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union
because they feared that a crack-down would endanger
Russian entry into the far-eastern war.
Who advised patience with Russia? Marshall? At Potsdam
in July, Marshall's determination to have the Red Army
equipped by us and moved into Asia had not abated. Stetti-
nius reports with some perplexity on page 98:
Even as late as the Potsdam conference, after the first
atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos on July 16, the
military insisted that tho Soviet union had to be brought
into the far-eastern war.
In his endeavor to exculpate Roosevelt of blame for
shame of Yalta, Welles saddles the blame on the combined
Chiefs of Staff. We know that it was Marshall who formed
and carried through those decisions. Welles attributed Mar-
shall's desire to have Russia in to "a basic misapprehension of
existing facts." This appears on page 153 of his book.
Is that the answer? Or was Marshall's insistence that Russia
should be allowed to serve her own interest - not our - in
eastern Asia a part of that pattern which has been emerging
with ever greater clarity as we trace his career: a pattern
which finds his decisions, maintained with great stubbornness
and skill, always and invariably serving the world policy of the
Kremlin?
The President had another adviser at Yalta, Alger Hiss.
Was it upon the advice of Hiss, who served on the Far
Eastern desks and was deep in the China plot, that Roosevelt
chatting companionably with Stalin, assured him that "the
blame for the breach [in China] lay more with the Comintern
and the Kuomintang than the rank and file of the so-called
Communists?" The quotation is from page 868 of Sher-
wood's revelatory book. It will be noted that the Communists,
the Kremlin lackeys who sent their armies against our
50
own in Korea, were to Roosevelt only "so-called' Commu -
nists, and pretty good fellows at that, more reasonable, the
President may have gone on to say, than Chiang Kai-shek's
bunch or even your own fellows, Generalissimo, in Moscow!
We shall encounter that view of the Chinese Reds as agreeable
innocents again when we examine Marshall's mission to China.
Let me assume for the moment that Marshall's judgment in
World War II was clouded by no ulterior objective, no hidden
thread of purpose which could not reach the light of day.
What kind of a "master of global strategy" would have made
the mistake of Yalta? What kind of strategic genius does that
display? The whole array of Marshall's strategical endeavors,
from Sledgehammer, or the "second front now," through his
timidity over invading Algiers by way of the Mediterranean,
to his downright insistence upon invading southern France two
months after D-day in Normandy, is un-reassuring. We inevit-
iably contrast Marshall's competence with MacArthur's during
MacArthur's grand march from New Guinea to Tokyo. In the
circumstances, how could we take Marshall's word on strat-
tegy? If he so overestimated the Japanese as to believe they
could fight on for a year and a half after the Germans quit in
Europe, how can we place any reliance upon his estimate of
the strength of the Russian empire and its Chinese satellite in
eastern Asia at this moment?
So the A-bombs fell on Japan and the war was over,
although so careful a military critic as Hanson Baldwin be-
lieves that the bombs hastened the end of the war, if at all, by
only one day. Japan's fate had been determined long, long
before. And with the end of the war Yalta's chickens came
promptly home to roost. The Red Army after a bloodless
campaign of six days took over all Manchuria; it stood also in
North China. The Reds were there by right, ceded them at
Yalta.
And so we come to the question of Korea. Who divided
that unhappy land at the thirty-eight parallel, ordering that
Russia should receive the surrender of Japanese forces above
that line, the United States below it? Here we have one of the
major mysteries of that time. At Yalta, Stalin had agreed with
Roosevelt on a four-power trusteeship for Korea, the powers
to be the United States, China, Russia, and Britain; a decision
which he ratified when Hopkins visited Moscow in the
late spring of 1945. The trusteeship called for a unified
administration a with a government of Koreans to
51
be freely elected and governing the whole peninsula. What
happened to the trusteeship? When Japan quit, there arose the
problem of accepting the surrender of the forces in the field.
Welles covers the situation on page 167 of his book Seven
Decisions that Shaped History:
Some subordinate officers in the Pentagon hastily recommended
that the Russians accept the Japanese surrender
north of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, while the
American troops would accept it south of that line.
I am told that this line was fixed because it was con-
venient. Certainly it was fixed by officials with no knowledge
of what they were doing, and without consulting any
responsible members of the administration who might have
had some regard for the political and economic considerations
which the decision so lamentably ignores.
There the matter rested until Senator Brewster of Maine
brought to light the fact that the thirty-eight parallel has
historic significance. I had wondered why the War Department
in August of 1945 chose to divide Korea for purposes, as was
said, of receiving the Japanese surrender, along the thirty-
eighth parallel. Why not the thirty-seventh, or thirty-ninth
parallel? Why had it to be the thirty-eighth parallel?
The Senator from Maine, in delving into United States
Relations, which is the continuing history of American foreign
affairs as published periodically by the Department of State,
found that the Russians had fixed the thirty-eighth parallel
nearly a half century ago, as the dividing line. They were
negotiating with Japan over the division of Korea between the
two imperial systems. So the Czar's diplomats proposed to
those of the Emperor of Japan that the 38th parallel be the border
between the two empires.
I refer to the testimony before the Armed Services and
Foreign Relations Committees on June 8, 1951, when Secretary
Acheson was being questioned by Senator Brewster on this point.
Acheson disclosed that the decision was taken not by "some
subordinate officers" but by the Secretary of War, was approved
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the State, Navy, Air Force
Coordinating Committee, and by the President. This was a
high-level decision, initiated by the Secretary of War. Who was,
in effect, the Secretary of War during the later incumbency
of Mr. Stimson? I think no one who was touch with the inner
workings of those adjoining offices at the
52
Pentagon, who has read the late Secretary's explicit memoirs,
who knows the inner relationships between the two men, can
doubt that in matters of this sort it was Marshall who made
the decisions, Stimson who rubber-stamped them.
It was Marshall who selected the line for the division of
Korea which was chosen by the Russian Foreign Office and
General Staff nearly fifty years ago. It was Marshall who
restored Russia's pre-1904 claims on North Korea in August
of 1945.
I refer you particularly to this colloquy, the Senator from
Maine asking, Secretary Acheson answering thc questions:
Senator Brewster: Isn't it rather interesting to note the
thirty-eigth parallel in Korea was proposed 45 years
earlier by Russia as a means of dividing the spheres of in-
fluence of Russia and Japan incident to the episodes around
the Russo-Japanese War?
Secretary Acheson. I am not familiar with that, Senator.
I content myself with noting that a Secretary of State
unfamiliar with the complex of imperial ambitions in the Far
East during the days when the United States was playing a
humane, a creditable and an American part in those affairs
can scarcely qualify as an expert on the diplomacy of the Far
East.
The war was over. Millions of Americans, mistakenly think-
ing that their international troubles were over too, had a 24-
hour celebration only to awaken before long to find that, even
as we were spending vast amounts of flesh and blood and
steel to win the war, there was being conducted what ap-
peared to be a planned loss of the peace.
53
THE END
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